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This is not the first time that the United Nations, and especially ECLA, is 
approaching the topic of youth from the point of view of full and effective 
participation in society.1/ However, the seriousness of the problems confronting 
the region, of which everyone is aware, are making the choices and demands of 
youth assume crucial significance, not only because the development process is . 
closely linked to the situation and possible participation of youth, but also 
because of the fact that young people constitute a group that is extremely 
vulnerable to the effects of the crisis, especially in the way in which it 
manifests itself in Latin America. 
The General Assembly has declared 1985 to be the International Youth Year 
and has approved a Programme of Measures and Activities in which concern for 
youth represents a long-term strategy from which sustained efforts are hoped for 
at the national, regional and international levels. 
The purpose of this document is to examine the situation, prospects and 
needs of Latin American youth in the context of the changes which the region has 
undergone in recent decades and in the face of the difficulties of the present. 
Some ideas will be put forward on the role of youth with regard to the future and 
with respect to the responses which society must necessarily make to their demands. 
Aware of its limitations, however, we should consider it to be a preliminary 
attempt and the beginning of a renewed period of intellectual reflection on the 
role of youth in the search for new fortes of development, which will no doubt be 
necessary for the readjustment of Latin America in the face of the challenge of 
the present and immediate future. 
It is not easy to escape the conceptual obstacles represented in choosing 
an appropriate definition of youth. For statistical purposes, the Uhited Nations 
defines youth as persons between 15 and 24 years of age; but the fact is that ' 
there is not, nor could there be, a universally-accepted definition of youth. 
Furthermore, given the current state of research, it is difficult to account for 
the diversity of sdcial situations of Latin American youth. 
A definition of youth which fits regional realities and needs is relatively 
difficult to come by since there exist many different criteria for determining it. 
A first criterioft, of a biological nature, sets the initial, point at puberty, 
that is, at the tinie when human beings acquire biological reproductive capacity, 
and closes the period at the time when biological development is concluded. A 
second criterion emphasizes the relationship between reproductive capacity and 
social dependence in relation to the adult generation, and locates its termination 
at the moment when young people can constitute'a family and mget the needs of that 
family. A third is of a variable nature, according to the societies and groups 
to which it is applied, since it takes into consideration the time of education 
and leisure prior to the fulfilment of independent social positions. 
/Because of 
Because of the particular features of Latin American development, the 
situation of youth varies greatly according to the social group in question. For 
rural and marginal urban groups -which begin to work at an average age .:of .10 
years- youth begins at a very early age, since from that moment on, they are 
initiated into economic and social responsibilities which, put an abrupt end.^to ; . 
the predominantly playful nature -which -childhood is supposed to have. . .In -these 
same groups, the constitution of the family and the assumption of full responsi-
bilities also begins at an eaçly age.. However, in labour and soo.ial relations, • 
they continue to .occupy subordinate: positions typical of young people,. For. 
purposes of policy elaboration., the indication made, above by way of example' . . 
should be borne in mind, since the different subgroups of youth have different 
situations and needs. Although a series of common topics can be indicated, 
youth is far from being a monolithic group. 
It should also be stressed that the situations and problems of youth are 
not a phenomenon concerning them exclusively , . but reflect, the problems of the 
societies in which they are inserted. Therefore, they should be analysed in the 
framework of the global economic development process and of social and political 
changes in the region, with special.reference.;to the. social, economic and cultural 
features grouped under the general category.of "youth". ... 
: . . In this, connection, one must keep in mind a few of the basic variables ;of 
the social transformation of the region in. the last few decades.. They include 
the magnitude of the population increase .and,4ts consequences, on the; availability 
of resources, the development possibilities pf .the. economic system and the changes 
of society through growing differentiation .of,social activities. It is obvious 
that the demographic significance of youth is particularly relevant. Additional 
factors are the accelerated urbanization process, with its impact cm the way in 
which national, units are constituted; the trend, towards integration of a system 
of values common to the population;; the creation; of conditions' for social inter-
action, participation and mobilization; the exposure of the different strata of 
society, to images of consumption; -the problems of marginality and the demands .. 
for. goods and services. Also important is; the transformation of the economic 
structure, especially the industrialization process, which, although it has a 
different meaning and historical context in each case, has generally meant a 
change, in the labour force, the development of. a .consumer goods market., the 
appearance of trends towards the constitution, of a; qualitatively different type 
of society in which new forms of rationality^ oqquF. wi;th respgct to organization 
and social participation, and the development-of scientific.; ̂ d; .technological 
capacity. • ,.| „ : <.-.• -.-.-.-
It is.also well known that in some;cases, the modern,tertiary sector 
-especially State services-, has. expanded beyond what had been, expected,from the 
evolution experience of the now-developed countries and the; phase of economic 
growth of the region. . . .,. >'-; . •-. -
To this may be added the impact of the transformation of agriculture, which 
is often reflected in emigration, the destruction of ancient indigenous cultural 
identities, the dismantling of peasant structures, the emergence of new social 
strata and the gradual interpénétration of the previously-separated rural and 
urban societies. 
/Lastly, the 
Lastly, the most rapid transformation recorded has occurred in the region 
in the educational and cultural conditions of the population. Important progress 
has been achieved with respect to illiteracy, previously-elitist types of 
education, such as the university, have tended to spread to the masses. Despite 
the achievements, attention should be given to the sectors excluded from education, 
since they are subject to an extremely serious cultural marginalization process, 
whose negative effects are even greater than in the past. 
The impact of the transformations on the social stratification, values, 
cultural models, shaping of personality and prospects for political action is 
undeniable. Despite the processes of change in the -region, they are not 
unidirectional, nor do changes of a single tendency all take place at the same 
period in history; or, when they are realized, they occur in a social period 
which is qualitatively different, among other reasons, because of the prior 
historical form of the national social structures. This generates a relative 
feeling of uncertainty as to the future development of the Latin American 
societies. However, it is not a question of collecting indicators of a certain 
social instability, but of thinking in terms of societies which must confront the 
reformulation of the forms of international insertion and must also pay attention 
to their internal forms of social relations, for the purpose of defining new 
styles of development. 
The enormous importance of the variable ideologies in our countries is due 
to the above. Unlike developed societies, in which the margins of structural 
change are relatively limiting, in the Latin American societies, the rapidity of 
the transformations permanently creates the idea that the possible may turn 
into the probable. 
The changes referred to have a particular influence on youth both in the 
type of considerations with respect to the modality of formation they require 
in order to be able to participate in a society which in many respects will be 
different from the present society, and with respect to the role that youth may 
play in the creation of the new societal models that are being observed. 
Not all the topics comprising this subject have been dealt with in this 
document, and it would have been difficult to do so; however, we have stressed 
the fact that youth constitute a group which will continue to be significant 
in the Latin American population until the end of the century, that, despite the 
efforts carried out in the area of education, enormous problems persist with 
regard to the training of the group as a whole, and that serious polarization 
still does appear between the highly-educated sectors and other, equally 
numerous sectors, which are in a situation of functional illiteracy. Incorporation 
into the labour market presents difficulties, and there is a new element: it is 
beginning to affect highly-educated sectors. Those lacking in education will 
meet growing difficulties in incorporating themselves into societies which are 
gradually becoming urban and whose type of employment require higher qualifications. 
The distance, both in terms of education and experience of modernization, 
between the parents' and children's generations is so great as to affect families' 
socialization capacity and present serious challenges to educational institutions. 
/The central 
• The central problem is that of the participation of youth. The region has 
a prolonged history with respect to. the role of youth in political mobilization 
and promotion.of social and cultural change. Bearing in mind what has been said 
of the process of transition in Latin America, the participation of.youth is a 
key element in the orientation of the social change., and in the creation of 
social bases for democratic formsa all of which has an influence on the 
possibility of carrying forward a different; style of development. 
In the last place-,-¡.account should be -taken of the type, of -relationship 
which, society establishes;: with its youthv and the actions which the State carries 
out through its policies „assume particular.importance; nevertheless, it should • 
be stressed once more that ;it is not'only a .question of an assistentialist 
policy. The decisive aspect, is the recognition of the need for participation by 




I. DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE AND YOUTH 2/ 
1. Importance of the youth population 
The numeric weight of Latin American youth, that is, the segment of population 
between 15 and 24 years of age, is one of the highest in the world, and can only be 
compared with that of Southern Asia; in both cases young people represent 20.2% 
of the population of these regions. The growth rate of the global populatibn 
during the period 1960-1980 was, along with that of Africa, the highest in the 
world, and although the rate of growth is expected to decrease in the period 1980-
2000, Latin America will continue to be one of the most rapidly-growing regions. 
The total number of young people in 1960 was 38.5 million and in 1980, 73.3 
million, so that in recent years, the youth population has practically doubled. 
Furthermore, due to well-known demographic factors (global fertility rate, 
decrease in infant mortality, etc.), the proportion of young people in relation 
to the total population of Latin America has increased; thus, although in 1960 
youth represented 17.9% of the total population, in 1980 that proportion was 20.2%. 
The estimated figure for the year 2000 amounts to 19% of the total population, 
and, although that would represent a slight decrease with respect to the current 
figure, it would continue to be very considerable. 
2- Urban growth and youth population 
It should be noted that this phenomenon of population growth takes place with high 
rates of urbanization, whose growth rate is still considerable, although it 
definitely does not amount to the accelerated rates of the 1950s. Thus, the 
proportion of the urban population has increased appreciably; in 1950 it represented 
41% of the total, while it amounts to 63% today. 
The proportion of young people residing in urban areas is even greater than 
that figure and amounts to 65.2%. To a certain extent, this is due to processes of 
internal migration of youth from rural areas to urban areas. 
It is commonly assumed that these trends will become accentuated in the 
future and that Latin American society will come to be highly urban. It is 
estimated that 73% of its total population will have such features in the year 
2000. It should also be pointed out that everything points to the fact that 
urban concentration will be linked, as it has been until now, preferably to the 
growth of the large cities. In the 1970s, the population of the metropolitan 
areas represented 22% of the total population and 40% of the urban population. 
3. Agrarian population 
Our view of urban growth generally tends to be positive, and it is often assumed: 
that the decrease in the rural population rates is a clear indicator of 
modernization and development. Nevertheless it should be borne in mind that, 
/except for 
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except for some zones in the region, the density of inhabitants per square 
kilometre of area is not high, and would permit better conditions for human 
settlements if the man/land ratio were more favourable. Furthermore, the 
average annual growth rate of the agricultural product in the 1970s amounted 
to 3.3%, making agriculture remain behind the rest -of the economic activities 
(in the same decade,.the average annual growth rate, of the total gross domestic 
product amounted to 5.8%). The point we wish to make is that the main problem 
does not consist so much of the fact that there is a surplus of agricultural 
population, but that inefficient use is made of it. 
It should also be borne in mind that a phenomenon of aging has occurred 
in the rural population; in 1970 35.0% of the rural population was 25 years of 
age or older,- the percentage calculated in 1980 rose to 36.2%, and the estimate 
for the. year 2000 was 41,7%. It is obvious that such a phenomenon is due to the 
rural exodus much more than other factors. 
4. Different types of demographic evolution 
As we know, the Latin American region presents a great diversity of situations, 
both if the countries are compared to each other and among the different regions 
of. each country. In order to account for this circumstance to some extent, a 
classification has been used which takes, into consideration the magnitude of 
the fertility rates, the level of the per capita gross domestic product and the 
percentage of the urban population and divides,the countries into three large 
groups.3/ 
The first group is composed of Argentina,;Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile and 
Uruguay. This group of countries currently shows the lowest fertility rates 
of the. region* In the case of Argentina and..Uruguay, this feature .is of fairly 
long date, at least much earlier than the period 1955-1960. In Costa Rica, 
Cuba and Chile the fertility rate has decreased obviously although with different 
intensity, with respect to. its . 1955-1960 level.,, and it is estimated-that this 
trend will become even more marked in future. 
The foreseen effects may be of importance. It should be borne in mind that 
this group of countries contains Costa Rica and Chile, which in 1980 were among 
those countries with the most young people in the region. The prediction for 
the year 2000 is that the countries in this group as a whole will have the lowest 
proportion of youth population in Latin America. • 
Another fact worth emphasizing is that the population of these countries, 
with the exception of Costa,Rica.:-is predominantly urban. 
In short, this group of countries represents 14.6% of the population of the 
region. It stands out because its demographic trends precede those of the region 
as a whole. It also demonstrates the best relative level of socio-economic 
development, and it should be emphasized that,.according to estimates for the 
year 2000, this group will have the lowest relative weight of young people in 
the total population. 
/A second 
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A second group of countries is composed of Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and the Dominican Republic. 
Since nearly all of them have very high fertility rates, their rate of population 
growth will certainly be the highest in the entire region. Furthermore, the rate 
of growth of the population between 15 and 24 years of age will be equal to or 
higher than that of the total population. Therefore, these will be the countries 
which will.haye.the-highest rates of youth population in the year 2000. 
Another feature of the countries in this group is that urbanization has 
occurred later. With the exceptions of Nicaragua and Peru, the urban population 
is lower than 50%, with the extreme case of Haiti, where the urban population 
amounts to only 23%. 
In summary, this group represents approximately 18% of the population of the 
region, and it is estimated that this percentage will increase in the year 2000 
and will constitute around one-fifth of the population of Latin America at that 
date. It is also predicted that the presence of youth in the total population 
will be the highest in Latin America at that time. 
A third group of countries is composed of those whose indicators, fall into 
an intermediate category despite the fact that from the demographic point of 
view, they present different trends. In the case of Brazil, Colombia and 
Panama, fertility has decreased strikingly, and this trend is ejected to be 
maintained through the year 2000. On the other.hand, Mexico and Venezuela, 
with high per capita products and urbanization rates that are also considerable, 
will probably maintain a high growth rate, both with respect to the population 
as a whole and the youth segment of it. 
In short, if the population in general,, including young people, is due to 
grow at fairly significant.rates, and if at the same time there is a continual 
urbanization process in progress, although the .latter does not have the 
accelerated rate of the.1950s, the region as a whole will be urban to a large 
extent -approximately 73% of the total population- in the year 2000. There 
will also be different kinds of demographic transformation, according to each 
country's types of structure, for which reason they will present different 
features and problems, with respect to young people, in some important aspects. 
/II. THE 
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ÎI, THÉ INSERTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE INTO THE WORKING WORLD 
j;- Transformation of the production structuré 4/ 
The changes in this aspect hâve been extremely significant in Latin America, 
although a wide diversity of national situations and trends may be observed. 
In the region as a whole, onë'of the most.important phenomena has been thè. 
industrialization process, which ranges from more Or less incipient forms of .' 
import substitution to technologically more advanced types of industrialization, 
capable of producing for both the national and international inarkets.' From the 
end of the Second World War an increase could be observed in the productive 
forces of the secondary sector, with an increase in" the productivity of the 
labour force and of firms, which resulted in a rise in the national product. 
But in addition, emphasis should be placed on the role the manufacturing 
industry played in terns of absorption of the labour force. During the .past 
thirty years, employment in thé manufacturing sector increased at à rate of 
3.4% per year, and thus, large sectors of the population were, to a certain 
extent9 able to see their expectations satisfied both in their socio-occupational 
position and in having access, in général terms, to expanding and more 
differentiated forms of consumption. ..... 
However, in a certain number of countries, "Jtiieincorporation of labour into 
the secondary sector appears to have declined "in the. last decade. Nevertheless, 
development of the tertiary sector has shown the dynamism that the secondary 
sector ceased to demonstrate. In the last twenty years, the expansion of the 
so-called "modern tertiary sector" and especially of State services, has 
expanded notably. All this has been beyond what the region's stage of economic 
growth'and the evolution experience of the now-dévèloped countries have led to 
expect. In some countries the "tertiarization" of the economy has generally 
produced a spiralling of urban employment, not only manual but also of the type 
requiring an ever higher intellectual formation. 
One well-known fact is the decrease of the share of agriculture in the 
composition of the gross domestic product. While in 1970 it contributed 13.3% 
to the global product of the region, in 1980 its contribution fell to 10.3%. 
Nevertheless, despite these changes, the continued importance of agriculture as 
a source of labour should not be underrated. It was estimated that in 1980, 
36% of the economically active population was in that sector; from that point 
of view, therefore, it continues to be the single most important sector. 
2. The participation of youth in the economically 
active pqpulation 5/ 
The economically active population of the region in 1980 6/ amounted to 45.2% 
of the total population ten years of age and over. One of its most noteworthy 
features was the high proportion of young people composing it; it was estimated 
/that in 
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that in that year, one-third of the Latin American labour force was comprised of 
young people from 10 to 24 years of age. Another fact Worth noting is that 
59% of them were located in urban areas. Thus, in 1980, 48.2% of the total young 
people between 15 and 24 years of age were incorporated into the work force. 
As is to be expected, this phenomenon is greater in the rural than in the urban 
area, 52.1% and 46.1% respectively. 
This plentiful contribution of young labour has some important effects. 
The demand for work in the region is lower than the supply, and as a result, 
in some cases there may be a displacement of adult employment by youth who may: 
be hired with greater advantages for the employer, or in other cases there may 
be high rates of youth unemployment. A decrease of youth in the composition of 
the total economically active population has been noted in Latin America, 
basically due to the increase in the coverage of the educational system. The 
participation of youth is expected to decrease to around 27.5% of the economically 
active population in the year 2000. Despite this decrease, the estimated 
absolute number of persons who would be incorporated into the labour market is 
impressive-, it has been calculated that between 1980 and 2000, around 4.1 million 
persons would enter the market annually. It is also highly probable that the 
urban nature of the economically active population will intensify, and that the 
presence of women in its composition will increase. 
3. Youth in the different economic sectors 
a) Yc>uth and agricultural activity 
Although it is true that the number of persons incorporated into agricultural 
activity continues to be very high, as indicated above, its relative -and in 
some cases even absolute- decrease is one of the most significant phenomena of 
the transformation of the occupational structure of the region. This fact is 
particularly pronounced among young people, who have generally been the main 
participants in rural-urban migration. In the countries for which detailed 
information is available, a.greater reduction in the' agricultural participation 
rates has been recorded among young people than among adults. From the point 
of view of the percentage of youth in agricultural activities, some comparative 
figures between 1960 and 1970 are highly illustrative. In countries such as 
Argentina and Chile, which in 1960 were already showing relatively low percentages 
of youth population in agricultural activities (with respect to the total 
economically active population between 15 and 24 years of age), 19.3% and 26.4% 
respectively, in 1970 the figures decreased to 13.2% in Argentina and 22.8% 
in Chile. . 
In a country such as Mexico, which in 1960 had 53.6% of its economically 
active youth population in agricultural activities, the figure decreased to 
35.1%; similar phenomena occurred in Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama and 
probably in several other countries. 
/Even bearing 
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Even bearing in mind the transformation indicated above9 some[features of 
the problem should be. emphasized. The rural young person is less:, educated than 
his counterpart and enters the working world, prematurely. In general, he is 
incorporated into a type, of agricultural employment which he has few possibilities 
of leaving, given his.,low educational level snd the increasingly, higher : 
educational requirements for applying for non-agricultural- occupations,¿¡., It . 
is therefore not surprising that there is a nucleus of social marginality among 
young people in agriculture, .which .in turn forms, a cycle of intensive .reproduction 
of marginality. The marked differences between the educational levels of urban 
and. rural youth illustrate, this fact.Available data for Panama,, 'through the 
population census of 1980, and for.Chile, from the National Employment Survey 
(October-December 1980), indicate that in the case of Panama only 3.4% of urban 
youth (15-24 years) have'.an educational level of less than three, years, while 
the percentage rises to 17.3 in the case of rural youth. In the case of Chile, 
only 3.0% of urban youth have less than three years of education, while 10.7% 
of rural youth are in this. category. It we take the opposite view, the figures 
are al§o significant: . in Chile 53.7% of urban youth, have 10 years of-education, 
or mote,:and;..44% in Panama* while in rural, areas the percentage, in Chile is 
only 17.6% and;17,l% in Panama. • , . 
b) Youth and urban activities. . ; - ••; 
It is commonly-stated that-the. accelerated urbanization-process has not 
been accompanied by a corresponding creation of jobs and as! a result, this 
has forced young people to seek jobs in the informal tertiary sector, whosè" 
main features are underemployment and disguised unemployment, such as occur in 
jobs in domestic service, pérsonal services or itinerant.trade! .However, 
without disregarding the possible truth:of that.'statement,, the fact.;of greatest 
significance would appear to. be that the youth of the region are undergoing 
increasing segmentation in their forms .of- occupational insertion;, : which results 
in extreme polarization between the différent social strata of .youth. . 
For example, youth in the rural Sector who.have succeeded; in migrating to . 
the cities, compared with those who remain in agricultural, activity, are generally 
the ones who.have better preparation, education and capacity for meeting 
situations: of .change. However, not only do those young migrants come up 
against considerable cultural barriers, but they are alsordisadvantaged with 
respect to youth.of urban origin. Their educational level is so elementary that 
they meet prolonged difficulties in ohtaining stable employment. They are often 
forced /to resort to acti vities which actually constitute disguised; unemployment. 
Such young people have occupations mainly in the lower strata of services and 
trade activities, which are characterized by a low capital-labour ratio, low 
productivity and low remuneration level. ' ; ; -
With regard to urban youth specifically,.one.observes a highly differentiated 
and increasingly complex internal structure, and this.:,gives rise to simultaneous 
and contradictory processes of differentiation and occupational mobility. 
/Youth from 
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Youth from the lowest strata, those whose families may be classified as 
belonging to the critical poverty category, tend to remain confined to closed 
circuits of marginality, a situation which is made even more acute by the 
excluding features of the style of development prevailing in the region. 
A different dimension is provided by the fact that there is a trend in 
the cities towards expansion of trade and service areas, especially in their 
modem sectors.; A similar statement iiiay be made concerning industrial employment, 
whose modern sector, that is, enterprises of high productivity and technological 
complexity, is expanding. In either of the cases, personnel recruitment favours 
the possession of high educational levels and a type of prior training which 
ensures the applicant's adaptability to the work environment in the sector and 
serves as an indicator of his potential for future training. 
Without doubt, much of the absorption of the young human resources in the 
modern;tertiary sector in recent years is linked to the vast expansion since 
the beginning of the 1970s, of education, social services, administration and 
State functions. The growth of public employment was especially marked and 
even increased its rate in the 1960s, although in some countries, from the 
second half of that decade a change in policy occurred in relation to the 
development and growth of State activities, which abruptly checked the process 
in those cases. 
It should be borne in mind that during 1970-1980, a certain dynamism was 
observed in the modern tertiary sector, which became a source of jobs for youth 
with higher, education. Such processes took place mainly in those countries 
where the processes of social change and economic transformation were characterized 
either by a. substantial growth rate or by the development of production Support 
services, social and urban services in general, or by both phenomena, which was 
accompanied, in other countries, by a reduction in the rate of incorporation 
of new. young labour into industry.. 
Different types of development and occupational 
insertion of youth 
With reference to the first grouping of countries indicated in chapter I, section 
4 (Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile and Uruguay), youth participation in 
the labour force fluctuates, between 24% and 26%, of which 80% of the supply is 
found in urban areas. For these countries it is estimated that the growth rates 
of the economically active population, both total and youth, will be the lowest 
in regional terms. This fact is accentuated in Costa Rica and Cuba, which 
show- a marked decrease in their fertility rates. . '' 
The second group, which includes Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala;,' 
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and the Dominican Republic, is 
coirposed, with the exception of Peru, of countries in which the rural sector is 
predominant. As a result, agricultural activity continues to be the main 
/employment-generating 
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employment-generating activity. In urban areas9 the informal sector and domestic 
service occupy a substantial portion of the labour force. The industrial and 
service sectors are proportionally lowe?. than those of the rest of the countries 
of the region, and it may be surmised.. that the latter sectçr.is substantially 
composed of unskilled personal services. 
In this group of countries, the, presence of youth.labour (10-24 years) 
is. the highest in the conposition of, the eccmomically activé population and in 
some cases represents around 40% of ,the total labour supply in 1980. The labour 
of children.between 10 .and 14 years*. of age .is. fairly common, .especially in the . 
rural areas, fin countries such ..as EÎ. Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Nicaragua an<d the Dominican,,Republic., more than 30% of the children .in this 
age category are in the labour market... It should be borne in mind that minors 
who have entered the labour market are generally engaged in full-time work. 
' jtt is estimated that between 1980 and 200P, the growth rate of the 
economically active population will i?e quite high, exceeding 3% per year in some 
countries; however, this growth may'take, placé with.the problems referred to above. 
The third group of countries, Brazil,„Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela,' 
is characterized.by the, corexistence of a relatively numerous „agricultural sector 
and a substantial portion of modern industries and services. The proportion of 
youth (10-24 years) in the total labour supply fluctuates from 31% in Venezuela 
to 36% in Colombia. 
If the 'occupational structure of these countries in 1980 is. considered, it 
is observed that agriculture in many of them -especially Brazil and Mexico-
continued to be the sector, generating the. most, employment (37% of the econbmically 
active population). Mention, lias been'made of the growing importance/of the : 
modem portion, of the service and industry séctor, but the. latter not only 
co-exists along with substantial agricultural activity,,, ¡but also with'very . . 
inefficient forms of employment. By way of example, we may cite the case of 
Colombia and Mexico, whose, informal sector absorbs 16% and 18% of the urban 
labour force respectively; . ; . 
The, estimates of the.probable evolution, which the labour force in these . , 
countries will undergo through the year 2000 predict growth rates slightly lower 
than that of the predominantly rural countries referred to previously. The 
latter will be around. 3% per year, and in thé former case it will probably be 
higher than that percentage.. With regard to.youth participation in the labour 
force, it is assumed that Mexico and Venezuela will maintain growth rates of 
2.6% per year, while in Brazil, Colombia and Panama, the growth rates will" 
be slightly higher than 1% per year. It is obvious that these rates will largely 
depend on the behaviour of the fertility rates, and on the type of educational 
coverage available to the pqp.ula.tion. , 
/III. YOUNG 
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III. YOUNG FEMALE LABOUR. GROWING IMPORTANCE 1J 
1. Increase in female labour 
Female labour tends, in some categories, not to be recorded statistically, and 
that omission is even more serious in the case of agricultural activities. 
Nevertheless, despite these discrepancies in the information, a growing 
incorporation of women into the labour force, or at least into work recognized 
as such, can be noted. 
The total economically active population of the region increased at a rate 
of 2.9% between .1970-1980; during the same period, the economically active female 
population increased at a rate of 3.6%. The highest growth was recorded in urban 
areas, where the rate of increase of the economically active female population 
amounted to 4.4% per year. 
It should be noted that thè highest increase in the rates of participation 
of women m the last 10 years occurs among young women, especially those in the 
20 to 24 years age group. Furthermore, a distinction must be made between the 
forms of occupational insertion of .women in different social strata. The Regional 
Employment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean (PREALC) estimates that 
in 1980, the informal sector absorbed 14% of the total economically active 
population in the urban zones of. Latin America, and domestic service around 6%, 
and it is supposed that a substantial portion of these groups is composed of. 
young women. 
The ihèorporation of women into the working world has various facets, and 
if in'the case of middle- and high-income sectors there are, in addition to other 
determining factors, some personal options linked to self-actualization, among 
young women from working-class sectors, even though their early entry into the 
labour market is due mòre to family survival strategies, they are nevertheless . 
increasingly tending to perceive employment in positive terms. 
The occupational activities of women belonging to the middle-income strata 
tend to be concentrated in trade, administration and especially social services, 
<among which education is usually the highest category followed by health and 
social welfare. 
Women in the popular strata tend to perform activities in the traditional 
tertiary sector, especially domestic service, although this phenomenon seems to be 
decreasing in some countries. In Chile and Panama, the countries for which 
up-to-date information is available, a gradual decrease is being recorded in the 
number of young women between 15 and 24 years of age who are performing domestic 
service. In the first country, in 1960 48% of the total number of women performing 
that function was composed of young people; the percentage decreased to 40% in 
1970 and to 29% in 1980. A similar trend is recorded in Panama, where the 
percentages for the same years were 40%, 36% and 28%. They also play an important 
role in small business and itinerant trade. In the case of women workers, they are 
incorporated into activities such as textile manufacturing or electronic products 
assembly, which absorb a high volume of female labour. 
/Emphasis should 
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Emphasis should be placed on the polárization of female labour, a phenomenon 
which tends to perpetuate itself. At one extreme are the women from the middle-
and upper strata who have a high.degree of education, work in non-manual 
activities and have a higher participation in the economically active population 
than the men in their group; at the other, are women from the popular» sectors, 
barely-educàted and working in the traditional tertiary sector. , 
Types of development and young female labour 
In the countries of early urbanization, the number of womèn making up the 
economically active population is comparatively high, although the increase in 
supply appears to be more or less stabilized. Since these are countries of early 
urbanization, women were incorporated ..into the labour market earlier than in 
other countries, 'which explains the trend above., 
The high proportion of women in the economically active young population 
in Argentina,..34%, is striking, since the percentage is considerably higher than 
• the "femáíe participation in thè total economically active population, 26%. If 
account is taken of the country's type of development it may be assumed that an 
occupational1 demand h$s been created, èvèri for relatively skilled services, which 
preferably incorporates yovpigwomen, whose, tiinè.. spent in the occupational market 
would only be temporary.1 "Furthermore, the femaie''labour curve in the country..; 
is bimoda:l, a phenomenon wlriiph can certainly be attributed ;tor the fact tbàt women 
leave their jobs when tftey marry or have children., although á smáll. portion . 
re-entér thè occupational market'when their children are older. 
In the predominantly agrarian countries, the rates of participation- of 
women ih the labour force haye increased considerably, especially between 1970 
and 1980, although account should be taken of the fact that the measured : 
participation of wbmen iri; "the labour forcé has been very low. The source of 
employment is domestic work or non-remuneráted family work; the latter not, being 
recorded in the official statistics. As stated earlier, the informal sector is 
also important with respect to'recruitment of young women into the labour force. 
/IV. UNEMPLOYMENT 
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IV. UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT AMONG YOUTH 8/ 
1. Problems of unemployment 
One of the greatest problems confronting Latin American youth is the lack of 
employment opportunities. Open unemployment is particularly acute among youth in 
urban areas, and rates of 15% or more are common. In many cases it is not 
unlikely for youth to represent more than 50% of the total unemployed of all ages, 
and it should be pointed out that this does not only involve adolescent 
unemployment. At times half of the unemployed young people are in the 20-24 years 
age group.; Unemployment also affects mainly young women. 
Empirical research on patterns of youth unemployment in Latin America 
indicate that a great deal of the present high level of youth unemployment is 
related to the very high labour turnover rates exhibited by that group, since they 
are often able to find only precarious and casual jobs. Furthermore, the burden 
of youth unemployment is unevenly distributed and falls heaviest on those from 
the low socio-economic urban strata, who experience' serious and prolonged 
difficulties in the labour market. 
Moreover, unemployment to some extent is observed among youth who should, 
because of their capacities and qualifications -especially educational- have less 
difficulty in terms of employment possibilities. However, this can be explained 
by the fact that such young people are usually in a position to devote a longer 
period of time in searching for work more suited to their capabilities, but once 
they find it, there is: a greater tendency towards stability in that stratum than 
among youth from low. socio-economic strata. 
2. Problems of underemployment 
Underemployment among Latin American youth has even more alarming features than 
open unemployment, although in situations of recession such as the current one, 
open unemployment is obviously critical. 
The incorporation of youth into dead-end jobs and the plight of young people 
who are not active in .the labour force but are not incorporated into the 
educational system either contribute to the persistence and extension of 
situations of critical poverty. 
Dead-end jobs are not exclusively low-wage positions, but are often 
precarious casual jobs with little prospect either of a stable career or the 
acquisition of useful training and experience. 
Marginal youth and those from low income strata are commonly affected by 
the above. Research on youth employment in a marginal area of. Santiago,•Chile, 
conducted in 1975, showed that 43% of employed persons in the 15-18 years age 
group were either in casual, jobs or jobs with fluctuating income. Another 14% -
worked as domestic servants and 12% in the government Minimum Employment Plan. 
Only 25% had regular jobs with steady incomes, and of these half worked as 
messenger boys or maintenance workers. 
/It is 
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It is often affirmed that many young people have precarious or casual jobs 
because the jobs are only a supplement to their main activity, which is that of 
student. This does not appear to be the case for Latin America; in countries such 
as Brazil and Chile the reverse has .been found to be .the case. If account is 
taken of the hours and conditions dëVoted"to the activities of study and work, 
such young people are primarily workers who usually study part-time in evening 
programmes which, moreover, have been designed for adults and not to. satisfy the 
educational needs of young people, 
3, Unemployment and, educational levels 9/ 
It should be recalled that various, empirical studies have shown..that'in. Latin > 
America, especially in urban areas, education was a highly significant 
discriminatory variable. Educational deficiencies appeared linked,.• in•a:rigid 
vicious circle, to poverty. And at the beginning of the last decade, persons 
between .20 and 29 years of age, who had. less than 3 years of primary éducation 
were practically excluded from jobs, in the modern tertiary sector; it was very 
difficult for them to obtain employment as industrial-workers and,even in other 
activities. Most of than could incorporate themselves?only into agriculture or 
the informal urban sector, r r 
Unemployment, generally.tended to be lower, to thè:extent .that the educational 
level was higher. .There appears..to. be ascertain stepwise pattern in urban areas. 
For men, open unemployment declines gradually, with increased elementary schooling. 
Completed basic education, appears to represent a plateau. A second level 
corrèsponds to secondary: education; those who leave: school with incomplete 
secondary education have difficulties¿ while: considerably less unemployment is 
registered at completed secondary levels. The.problems recorded by the statistics 
for persons with incomplete secondary education are largely due to what could be 
called an inconsistency of situation* Young people with intermediate education 
consider that .the activities they "can perform -and for which they have in part 
be^n..trained-^correspond to a qualitatively different level than those carried out 
by persons, with only.primary education. But since they have not completed their 
secondary education, their situation is ambiguous, and they believe that the 
positions offered to them are lower than their qualifications. 
It is obvious.that in the relatively less-developed.'countries, the majority 
of young unemployed people is concentrated among unskilled persons with little 
education, but in countries such as Argentina and to a lesser extent Chile, the 
unemployed with some or even complete secondary education account for a high 
percentage of the total unemployed in the. 20-24,years^ age group. 
It is interesting to examine the distorting effects which can sometimes . •" 
be caused by the scarcity of the labour market in relation to supply. A permanent-
increase is being observed in the educational requirements for jobs which do not 
require very.high qualifications, as is the casé for some administrative or even 
manual occupations. But this is not only visibleas regards persons with little 
education; the considerable increase in supply of young people with university 
training has led them.to Compete in segments of the labour market traditionally 
reserved for graduates of secondary education. 
/An additional 
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An additional comment should be made concerning women, among whom the 
unemployment levels of those who have completed their secondary education are 
very high; at times their situation is worse, than that of illiterate and poorly-
educated women, who find work in domestic service jobs, cottage industry and other 
informal sector occupations where education is not a decisive factor. In any 
case, educated young women with secondary or higher education encounter more 
difficulty than young men with equal qualifications in keeping out of the ranks 
of the unemployed. 
4-, Lack of correspondence between educational levels and u 
occupational qualifications 
Given the considerable expansion of the educational system and especially that of 
its secondary and post-secondary levels, it cannot be hoped that occupations 
requiring a capacity for organization and direction will increase at the same 
rate. As a result, it is normal for the educational levels to be higher among 
the young generations than the previous ones for performing ¡the same type of 
occupation. This phenomenon has been qualified.as; negative because it was 
considered to indicate an inconsistency between education and its use. However, 
it should be noted that the highest levels of educational formation improve the 
cultural and human profile of society and that, although higher education is not 
always necessary to perform specific occupations, the complexity of urban social 
life and of both public and private productive and service organizations does 
require a higher level of culture from their members. " It should also be stated 
that greater human capacity makes it possible to adapt to changing technological 
projects and that greater efficiency in the performance of tasks often cannot be 
measured quantitatively because it is reflected in the quality of the products 
created or services rendered. Finally, it should be observed that a polarization 
in urban occupations is being produced between mere activities of execution, 
simplified by the production processes, and others which assume initiative and 
adaptative and.problem-solving capabilities. Under these conditions, it cannot 
be proposed that the educational systems.should train some for repetitive 
activities and others for innovative activities, because of the consequences that 
such an allocation would have for social life in general and especially its 
democratic dimensions. 
The graduate of the educational system cannot be considered to be an end 
product designed precisely to perform specific occupation, since throughout working 
life, many apprenticeships occur which are just as important as the initial 
educational training and which form the basis for labour mobility, central to 
a process of productive change such as the one being recorded in Latin America. 
This explains why the same types of jobs in the industrial sector are being 
carried out by persons with different educational levels.10/ 
Employers, for their part, are faced with an occupational demand which is 
much greater than supply, especially for those occupations which provide 
satisfactory income and social status. This leads them to require educational 
credentials which are increasingly higher and which in some cases are not 
necessary for the posts to be filled. This behaviour is also influenced by the 
provisions on future occupational mobility in countries where industrial 




The negative aspect of this process is the fact that the sociai groups which 
recently acquired some degree of education are finding themselves'passed''over in 
the job market, since the highly-educated, when they ¿re not able to find the 
most prestigious occupations, shift "td those of lower rank, causing a generalized 
downward movement in which the lowest ranks, that is those with rudimentary 
educations, are driven out of the formal job market. 
In any case the solutions do not lie in a reduction of educational supply 
but in better coverage for marginal social groups so that they might compete in 
the labour market. and in a wager-that the improvement of the educational profile 
of youth even in cases where they cannot be used in the immediate future would be 
extremely significant in Latin America's necessary transition period towards a 
society gradually permeated by knowledge and ; towards a production system 
increasingly conditioned by technology. ".. . 
.. .This view of the problem implies that education should not be expected to 
act as a stepping-stone to high-social'positions, .but as a necessary formation 
for human development1 and scientific-technological competence. 
V. THE EDUCATIONAL -TRANSFORMATION AND ITS IMPACT -ON 
NEW GENERATIONS 11/ 
1. The great changes in the education of Latin American youth ^ 
In the last three" decades, changes in education have occurred which are appearing 
among youth and will have a greater influence in the future on the generations 
currently being educated. In the 1950s, illiteracy had reached alarming 
proportions: half of the population over 15 years of age in many countries of the 
region were declaring themselves to be illiterate. Today," t>h the other hand, in 
a series of countries, illiteracy is already residual among youth; in others it is 
predominantly decreasing, which indicates that it will probably be residual 
towards the end of the century. Nevertheless, in countries with a high percentage 
of agricultural population or with a substantial indigenous ethnic component, 
illiteracy figures higher than 15% are still being recorded. It should be borne 
in mind that the most heavily populated country of the regionj Brazil, is also in 
that situation. It should also be stressed that the perpetuation of a group of 
illiterates, under chronic conditions and even into the futuréy: "implies a greater 
social discrimination than in the past. 
Closely connected to the above is the fact that, although nèàrly all children 
today have access to primary school, only half of them manage to complete an 
average educational cycle of 6 years. This has an influence on the current and 
future youth generations, by creating à'seribus5 cultural and social imbalance, 
since it ié absolutely essential for th'e:" population-to' share a basic cultural code 
in order to achieve the best economic, social^and political development." 
/Secondary' education 
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Secondary education was generally characterized in the past as being, a type 
of elitist formation conceived as a path to university studies although, in some 
cases, it also qualified people to perform some middle-level functions,., especially 
in teaching or bureaucratic posts. This was often accompanied by manual 
technical training with a high practical component, acquired by some urban groups 
of a low social level. Secondary education has been changing into a gradually 
more integrated type of education with regard to.general cultural formation and9 
very importantly, is reaching a higher proportion of the population, between.15% 
and 70% of the 13-19 years age group, although with marked variations among , 
countries. 
Finally, higher education has experienced a rapid quantitative transformation. 
Towards 1950 it included only slightly more than 1% of youth from 20 to 24 years 
of age, while today it reaches more than 16% and in nearly all the countries of 
the region, at least one in every, ten young people of university age attends the 
university. 
These quantitative changes must be boyne. in mind, because they account for. 
an important qualitative change. Elitist levels have changed into mass levels 
for the youth, population, so, that youth must be considered as a potential human 
resource whose cultural capacity and future political participation will be of 
great influence in the transformation of Latin America. 
Furthermore, the speed and extent of the change have meant a break between 
past generations and the present one. In most cases the family encountered 
difficulties in acting as an efficient socialization agent for the new generations; 
the majority of them lacked the cultural elements for expressing the message they 
hoped to transmit to their children. A socialization among "young peers" has 
occurred; in many cases, young people share daily experiences in educational 
institutions and extend this social interaction in the search for spaces of their 
own for recreation, dialogue or political communication. 
2• Particular features of the educational transformation in 
the different countries of the region 
As has been implied, the specific form which the educational transformations in 
the region have taken acquire particular features in each country. A first 
group contains the countries of early educational modernization which have achieved 
nearly total primary school attendance and a consistent development of their 
secondary and higher educational levels. • . • 
Another group of countries can be characterized as having a kind of 
"mutation" in its educational levels; they are characterized by the continuation 
of substantial and numerous social groups excluded from obtaining complete primary 
education, although at the same time, they have vastly expanded their levels of 
higher education and are the countries of the region in which the highest 
university attendance is recorded. 
/A third 
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A third group is characterized by the inequality of the transformation, and 
shows marked differences between the rural and urban populations and regional gaps 
within the countries. The educational expansion in these cases has had the sáme 
distortions as' economic development and in addition appears to be closely 
connected to the patterns of income concentration. 
Finally, there are cases in which there has been an integral planning of ; 
the educational-process, which has emphasized both integral and basic education 
and literacy programmes in the traditionally excluded Sectors. This has involved 
a policy of equalizing society through education, which at the higher levels, 
often constitutes a mechanism for selection of human resources with a definite 
connection'to thfe economic system and its estimated labour needs. 
3. Contradictions and conflicts arising from the 
V ; educational transformâtiori ' 1 ' 
It is natural for a quantitative expansion of the size indicated -without the 
intervention óf a programme of teacher training; endowment of material resources 
and -educational renovátion- easily' to result- in a déteriorátión in the quality of 
the knov/ledge ̂ txànsmitted for the áocial grbúps recently incorporated into the 
educational system'. ' In this sense-the démocratie transformation in terms of 
volume was not accompanied-by a similar transformation in the nature of scholastic 
culture and in the ways in which knowledge was transmitted. In general, both 
continue to be conceived as if it were à 'question of education for the elite, and 
theref<$'¿' are proving to be inadequate for incorporating people from subcultures 
so higftly. differentiated äs those resulting from the social heterogeneity" of the 
region into a universal culture. 
' Furthermorethèuniversalisation•ai'education assumes the principle of 
selection based on'merit for the different; positions in society, which comes into 
strong opposition with the orientation of the privileged groups, who resist that 
type of democratization in the social area. As a result, the educational forum 
has implicitly become ah area in which opposing pressures are brought to bear: 
the great majority demands.a universal education and-the high-strata group attempt 
to cancel out that egalitarian effect through a stratification of the educational 
system in which, While some teaching cyciës continue to educate at the highest 
scientific and académie level, the others, which are products of t h e recent 
expansion, bécaiise of a deterioration of material and bùman resources and an often 
hasty acceptancë of educational aspirations, find that they are forced to provide 
an education of low cultural and scientific content, in which the ritual passing 
of courses tends to be as easy as admission itself. 
Under such conditions, education ceases to be the cultural and social 
homogenizatiori:agent"and gives rise to education characterized by tbe type.of 
institution in•whiëh it <was carried out, so that the high-strata groups recover 
the distingüiáhihg value of knowledge while the diplomas obtained by the masses 
lose prestige. In some countries, this phenomenon has had the obvious manifestation 
of the emergence of a university system ranging from centres of excellence through 
institutions of mere accreditation, whose education would not be much higher than 
that of a high school. 
/In this 
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In this way, selection takes place according to presumed criteria of 
knowledge which would mainly be attributed to the type of institution in which the 
people were educated, making it possible to enhance the prestige of some educational 
institutions traditionally directed towards the formation of an élite ór towards 
attracting special groups of privileged social status. Such selection would not be 
very different from the traditional or adscriptive type, according to which 
individuals are chosen to perform specific jobs by virtue of their social origin. 
This would now be manifested in the type of educational institution, which would 
have the result of weakening the democratic effect of the quantitative expansion. 
VI. YOUTH IN MARGINAL SITUATIONS 
Analyses of marginality in Latin America have been closely linked to the phenomenon 
of rapid urban growth. It has generally been associated with phenomena of 
precarious incorporation into the city, and its most visible dimension was the 
emergence of shantytowns known by different names in each.country: "villas miserias", 
"favelas", "poblaciones callampas", etc. But not only were precarious living 
situations involved, but it was argued that the existence of the shantytowns was 
the result of certain insufficiencies of economic growth, in that, for example, 
the.population grew more rapidly than 'the availability of employment, and that the 
industrialization that had been taking place did not have sufficient dynamism to 
generate the employment which would solve the problem. The phenomenon was 
aggravated by the migration from the country, to the cities, which was affected both 
by phenomena of exodus from agrarian zones because of their inability to keep a 
large quantity of people employed, and by the attraction of the modern urban world 
for rural inhabitants. 
At the beginning, it was argued that a phenomenon similar to that caused in 
Europe by the industrial revolution was taking place and that it could therefore 
be temporary. That is, in a beginning stage seme population imbalances and 
uprootirigs with respect to their traditional occupations were predictable, which 
would later be solved by the new opportunities which the modern structure would 
create. 
However, it soon became obvious that in Latin America the processes were 
different. Although the growth of employment in industrial activities was . 
considerable, there was a much more rapid increase in the service sector, both the 
personal service sector typical of informal employment and a modern tertiary 
sector which included employment in production support services, trade and social 
and community services, which were considered to be surplus employment because 
they exceeded -in percentage of the economically active population- that recorded 
in similar stages in the. now-developed "economies. Both phenomena were attributed 
to the lack of dynamism of the economic system to generate productive employment. 
In addition, it was pointed out that Latin American industrial development was 
being carried out with a technology which was not the most appropriate for our 
conditions. Modern technology tended to economize labour and make intensive use 
of capital; that was not suited to the conditions of the countries of the region, 
which had plentiful labour but not a great amount of capital available» 
/Recent analyses 
- 18 -
Recent analyses on the modem tertiary sector indicate that the rise of that 
sector does not have the negative features which are attributed to it, because it 
is in part a support for production activities -for example, financial services-
and in pàrt provides forms of. distribution of social income and formation of the 
capacities necessary for economic and: SbciaT organization purposes, such as. 
education and health. 
But in fact the problem of marginality does persist. In concrete terms, all 
of these observations led to the abandoning of the theory according to which 
margin al ity was temporary and emphasized the study of the determining factors of 
its durability. Thus, the chief concern today centres on learning about the 
so-called "circuits of marginalità, which is equivalent to analysing how 
marginal ity is reproduced. This is of supreme importance in studies on youth 
since it is obvious that the conditions for perpetuation of marginality appear in 
that group. 
The persistence of marginality appears to be closely linked tò the modalities 
of the styles of economic development of Latin America. If one definition of 
iriarginality can be the absence of a relativély equal share for people of available 
goods, whether the latter are economic, cultural or social, this is not simply for 
lack of those items, but rather due to problems'deriving from the type of develop-
ment prevailing in the region, which tends towards the con centrât ion o f those 
resources, with the resulting exclusion or margihation of certain social' sectors. 
The concentration is particularly obvious in the economic spheré and, as has 
repeatedly been shown, it takes place at two main levels; at one level, a few 
enterprises concentrate the advantages of the adoption of high-productivity modern 
technology and therefore generate most of the economic growth; while at the other 
there is a concentration of income by empresarios or capitalists -especially 
connected With the type of enterprises indicated above- and, although to a much 
lesser extentby those who perform tasks or functions linked to that modern 
stratum. In this way a majority of urban workers remain excluded from the benefits 
of the progress and as a result are compelled to work in what may be termed the 
"subsistence sector". 
The concentration process also manifests itself at the locational level, 
since most of the processing industry, technical and financial services and 
infrastructure prefer to hâve a metropolitan location. The result is a relative 
or absolute marigihation of large geographical areas, which have firmly-rooted 
population contingents of a considerable sizéi this is particularly obviòùs in the 
rural sector. r'' ; ' ' "' • •' ' 
Furthermore, since the Concentration phenomenon is closely linked to the 
structural heterogeneity of Latin America, in the economic Sphere productivity 
strata with substantial differences òhe from the other vtere taking shape, but the 
important and decisive fact is that the backward sectors contained significant 
portions of the labour force and of the total population. . 
An approach of this type stresses, the fact that the phenomenon of marginality 
is not an exclusively urban phenomenon, created by the difficulties of insertion 
into the city, but that it also takes place in rural areas, Since it is more a 
matter of exclusion and perpetuation of negative conditions, 
/l. Urban 
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1. Urban youth from marginal groups or In a situation 
of. critical poverty 
As stated above, urban poverty is currently defined by the contradictions of the 
structural transformation of the global society, which has not lacked a growth and 
development process but has been accompanied by a synchronization between the 
dynamics of demographic growth, the "expulsion" of agricultural workers and the 
capacity of incorporation of the industry and services in urban a±>eas. In other 
words, the speed of the urban growth is out of proportion to the increase in the 
resources necessary for an economic development of the cities, which is Reflected 
in an imbalance in the composition of urban employment, with problems of generalized 
underemployment and low productivity in much of the economically active urban 
population. There is a marked irregularity of work in some sectors, as occurs 
especially in construction, although it is to be found also in other occasional 
services. Irregularity of work is in fact another form of underemployment, since 
people's working capacity is not totally utilized during the course of the year. 
In short, a large sector of the urban population are in jobs outside of the modern 
sector of the economy, and manage to find work only in sporadic activities, 
intermediary activities in the retail trade or the provision of unskilled and 
frequently expendable services. 
Young people belonging to these groups are obliged to work at a very early 
age, frequently before 14 years of age, because of the distressing economic 
situation of their families, but in fact they only manage to insert themselves into 
casual jobs or jobs; of a level as low as or lower than that of their older relatives, 
and thus a circuit is created in which they are trapped. The overwhelming majority 
have an educational level lower than completed primary education, which makes it 
nearly impossible for them to find a way out of that cycle. 
They, generally have no access to any type of technical education or 
professional training, since in cases where such options do exist, they tend to 
belong to the most modern area of the economy and therefore favour those who already 
have some level of formal education. Other training systems exist which are linked 
to firms, and these young people do not appear to have a fixed connection with them. 
Nevertheless, the main, point is that youth belonging to marginal social groups 
cannot even make real use of their period of basic education. The type of teaching 
and transmission of knowledge in our countries, even in basic education, 
presupposes certain skills which are acquired in the family unit; for example some 
abstract ideas which make up the educational curriculum are comprehensible only if 
they have some concrete reference in the sphere of social experience of the person 
receiving the teaching. Obviously this is not the case for youth of marginal 
groups, whose extra-curricular socialization appears totally divorced from the 
assumptions of formal socialization. As a result, despite the time they do spend 
in school, they do not succeed in overcoming their semi-illiteracy. To these 
difficulties may be added the irregularity of their school attendance, their 




a) Negative socialization and abnormal behaviour 
The socialization of youth from marginal, urban families presents a, set- of 
signs of. deterioration. The families in these social strata experience the 
temporary absence of the head of household for work reasons, the nearly permanent 
absence of the mother or father, due to. the efforts required for satisfying basic 
needs and difficulties in socializing their young members because,of the socio-
cultural gap between the experience and education of the youth, and their parents. 
In short, the ability of the family to. act as a support.unit for the young . 
generations is extremely, weak, and its. defects are not remedied by collective social 
services» In addition, the relationship of marginal youth to culture is damaged, 
in the first place because most of them have no primary education, and in the. 
second place because there are no cultural:activities in centres which would give . 
them the opportunity to express themselves and access to the advantages of universal 
culture. . ".•'v-•-' ., 
Although it is true that-, due to the economic situation of the family, they 
have to delay their own consumer aspirations in order to meet. the bas.ic needs of 
the family group, the dominant culture imposes a strbng validation.of consumption 
which seriously affects the behaviour of marginal youth. The pressures to consume 
fall heavily on these young people, but it is mainly a desire thatris involved, 
since the very lack of resources impedes their access, to a real mass consumption. 
Thus, the pressure of advertising produces distortions in the youth 
subcultures, since they provide a large group susceptible :to cultural 
manipulation. Advertising and the communications, media tend to give form and 
content to these subcultures by•offering them an integrated, body of symbols and . 
representations. Marginal urban youth in particular are inclined to see advertising 
and consumption as representing their basic-psychological needs which are unsatis-
fied in the family. From.this, arises another source pf tension which widens the 
generation gap.: ,.'*.. .. .'..'. .. . . 
If to a certain extent this relations between young people and aduíts in 
Latin America are characterized by an intergenerationál confrontation, among 
marginal youth the signs, of rejection often: t^ke the form, of asocial or ¡antisocial 
behaviour. Uneducated marginal youth, whp .do not have jobs,, whose families are 
unable to integrate them, who are often.left out of specific;social policies, and 
who finally, lack even a~,physical space in which to.¡carry out their activities, 
tend to organize: themselves into peer„.groups disconnected from any social 
organization and tend to confront society with escapist actions. 
Thus, the phenomena of juvenile deliquency an4 drug;addiction reflect the . 
problems and contradictions of the societies into which tfiese young people are 
inserted. Besides the contradictions of tbe adult world and the cultural 
manipulation to which they are subjected, marginal youth,have other causes of such 
behaviour, which have to do with the difficult and distressing economic and social 
situation in which they live, and under which circumstances drugs are used to 
dull hunger, coldness or the boredom of inactivity, or as a way of temporarily 
escaping the harsh reality of their existence. The obvious economic determinations 
explaining these abnormal types of behaviour are the critical poverty levels at 
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which they live, aggravated by the circumstances of the current crisis, the high 
unemployment rates and the drop in family Incomes. The social manifestations are 
the splitting-up of families, school desertion, leaving the home and juvenile 
vagrancy. 
b) Political exclusion 
But we cannot fail to point out that one of the most important elements of 
marginalization is that of political exclusion, since young people in fact do not 
participate in basic decision-making. In the majority of the cases -as pointed out-
in addition to the fact that they have cultural, educational or whatever other 
type of deficiencies, they are not social actors because in Latin America the 
common situation is one of political inertia, and those groups lack powerful 
organizations and resources to help bring their interests to bear on Society as do 
other social groups. Nevertheless, there are some examples of the beginnings of 
mobilization, and young people would probably play a role in this connection. 
Many of the examples we know of respond to forms of activation from outside. 
Nevertheless for a series of motives, certain forms of community would appear to 
be coming into existence, arising from an experience such as type of location in 
the urt>an space, and making them aware of the exclusion and segregation imposed 
upon them. 
2. Rural youth: marginated youth in transformation 13/ 
The rapid rate of urban growth and development compared with rural and the 
selective migration of young people to the city combine to make the young people 
who remain in the country a sector that is increasingly left out of modernization 
and development. It is a fact that educated rural dwellers migrate to the urban 
area in greater proportion than those with little or no education, and this 
exacerbates the increasing gap in the educational levels of urban and rural youth. 
Those who remain in the country drop their'studies earlier, marry at an earlier 
age and become integrated into the economically active population in the lowest-
qualified and remunerated tasks:j generally as non-remunerative housewives or 
farmhands, and thus lose all hope of escaping the vicious circle of critical 
poverty through study or occupational mobility. Much of rural youth, then, 
constitute persistent centres of poverty, low education and deficient social 
integration, with a strong tendency to transmit the same situation to their one 
children. 
a) The transformation of the world of rural youth 
Within this general picture of growing differentiation as regards the modern 
urban sector, rural youth have been affected by profound -and at times contradic-
tory- changes in their environment, which are making them a generation that is 
very different fran that of their parents, and which gives rise to several unknown 
factors concerning the real meaning of the processes which characterize the new 
rural generation. Although they are increasingly less educated than the young 
people who grew up in or moved to the urban centres, they are also much more 
educated than the previous rural generations. In some countries this difference 
has been taking on spectacular significance in recent years. This is of particular 
/importance if 
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importance if account is. taken of the qualitative jump which it means for many 
young,people to ?cross ̂ the threshold of learning to read, write, an<$ do mathematical 
problems, compared with the illiteracy ;of. the majority of their parents. 
Futhermore, the current rural generation is less a peasant and agricultural 
generation in terms of their economic insertion. The deterioration of the soil 
and demographic growth are forcing large numbers of young peasants to supplement 
working the ; land with trade activities or salaried work, which frequently involve 
temporary and cyclical migrations to areas of modern commercial agriculture or.to 
the cities. The children of agricultural wage-earners, too, are finding that-,., , . . 
their economic insertion has changed radically: with the nearly total elimination 
of the more permanent and paternalistic relationships of the plantation, their 
relation to the agricultural enterprises of today is of an impersonal, clearly 
monetary and occasional nature, since the demand for day labourers.generally 
occurs in short periods of sowing and harvest, in some countries, the benefits 
of the agrarian reforms, whatever their specific form, have represented an attempt 
to increase the .capacity to produce a food surplus for the urban population. 
Finally, the development of the infrastructure.and the non-agricultural economy 
in rural areas provides rural youth today with some totally new economic alterna-
tives, due to the existence of better communications, new trade and service 
activities, the presence of agro-industrial activities, and the growing importance 
of State institutions and agencies in rural areas. 
Perhaps the area of greatest conflict and contradiction for rural youth today 
is the cultural areas- ¡having transcended the situation of a world apart charac-
teristic of rural life.. previously, due to the expansion of formal education, 
geographic Mobility and the penetration of urban mass, communication structures 
and economic activities into the rural; area, young people have.a view of the world, 
value scales and. life and consumption .styles that are very different, and even 
contrary., to those, handed down to the®-by: their parents. Ne.arly all of them 
managé to-learn something of the city, and of modern urban life; many emigrate, but 
others, driven by urban unemployment and underemployment and by their insertion 
into the lowest: echelon of the hierarchy of urban stratification , return to,the 
rural environment, having experienced, a permanent change in their perception, of 
the reality in which they move* , . 
b) ; •Indigenous youth 
In several countries which still contain a strong traditional rural presence, 
indigenous youth live in an extreme situation of a growing gap between their 
socio-economic level and that of the urban population. Nevertheless , the gap is 
smaller than that of previous generations. The indigenous population is decreasing 
as a proportion of the total population, but growing in abs olute terms an d ten ding 
to grow or maintain itself as components of the rural population in- countries 
where they have a strong presence, and especially as part of the critical-poverty 
stratum. Not only are: they generally the poorest in the rural population and those 
who migrate least to the urban area, but they also run up against language barriers, 
cultural barriers and discriminatory treatment, a situation which is associated . 
with the persistence of a semi-colonial.type of relationship. Due to language 
difficulties and deficiencies in the educational services in tbe indigenous rural 
/areas, many 
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areass many of them do not acquire functional reading, writing and arithmetic 
skills, although they are attending school for a longer period of time. Indigenous 
women in particular, because of their traditional cultural insertion, in which 
they fulfil economic roles that are vital to the survival of the family and because 
of the growing need for them to assume the functions of the more active members of 
the household who migrate periodically in search of work, are continuing to be the 
subsector with the greatest illiteracy of all. 
However, the in te rgene rational transformation is of enormous magnitude. 
The learning of Spanish, some education, and the extensive knowledge of the non-
indigenous and non-peasant world place indigenous youth at a great distance from 
the situation of their parents. A small minority, very important from the 
structural point of view, has succeeded in attaining relatively high educational 
and economic levels, and constituted a new elite. In past decades, this type of 
mobility also included processes of acculturation, denial of the indigenous 
identity, and imitative adoption of non-indigenous behaviours and values. 
Recently, and increasingly, there has been a marked tendency on the part of young 
people to revalidate the indigenous culture and institutions, which in some 
contexts is expressed by an attempt to separate the ethnic identity from a partic-
ular socio-economic stratum; in others, it causes an effort to be made towards 
strengthening the social autonomy of the ethnic groups and destroying the 
mechanisms of domination which have perpetuated their critical poverty. 
These socio-cultural changes and contradictions have daily far-reaching 
impacts on the traditional institutions of participation and production. While 
foreign value scales and new economic demands generally undermine and impair 
traditional: structures, the indigenous groups themselves are making efforts to 
take advantage of their own institutional resources for the purpose of development 
from within, which implies readapting them and often changing their form and . 
content. These changes frequently give rise to generational confrontations, in 
which indigenous youth challenge the authorities of their elders and question 
their ability to manage in the modern world. 
This acute situation of confrontation with adults who are less integrated 
into the urban culture affects not only indigenous youth but the majority of 
rural youth today. The latter differ from urban youth in that with a.certain .. 
regularity rural youth occupy positions of leadership, not only of youth social 
movements, but of community, labour and even political movements. The high 
proportion of almost complete lack of education and political and economic 
knowledge of the city among the parents' generation in some circumstances even 
makes the older adults legitimize the authority of the young people who are the 
only ones with the necessary knowledge and skills to defend the interests of the 
group in the current situation of interpénétration of the rural and.urban systems. 
Both in the context of demand mainly for. services and access to urban-type goods, 
and in movements demanding more equitable land distribution- or forms of greater 
State support for the peasantry, rural youth, despite their many short catlings 
with respect to their urban peers, have a great potential as political actors at 
the head of the growing mobilization of the rural masses, since they have an 
increasingly higher educational level and better knowledge of the political-social 
system. In those countries where the rural population has a strong presence and 
absolute growth, the new generation of rural youth is beginning to play an 
/important role 
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important role in the search for new styles of development that are Viable fpr all 
the ldwer sectors. Even in those where the rural youth population is decreasing, 
due to thè ¡stratégie nature of agriculture for helping to satisfy the demand for 
food from a growing urban population, and because of prohibitive import costs and 
the fact that there is a large-scale crisis in modern agriculture due to acute 
enérgy needs and other factors, the peasantry will probably obtain greater : 
bargaining power which will enable it to improve its current position. 
VII. COMPLEXITY OF THE CURRENT. SITUATION AND 
FUTURE PROSPECTS 
I. Structural problems 
The economic transformation of the Latin American countries has been very unequal, 
which has helped aggravate the differences between the relatively more or less 
developed countries. -In addition, from a social point of view, the benefits of 
the progress -where there was progress- have tended most of the time to be 
distributed very inequitably among the different social strata. In many cases the 
concentration of income has intensified, widening even more the difference between 
high and low strata in the majority of countries. As several studies have shown, 
in sane cases the distribution has been strongly concentrated at the highest 
economic-social strata* and there have even been relative losses in the share of 
nearly all the lower strata. In others, despite generali zed.growth, the middle and 
high groups have obtained greater benefits in relative terms. An illustration of 
this is the fact that in 1960 the average per capita income of .the richest 10% was 
33 times higher than that of the poorest 20% of the population:, <while in 1975 that 
average income was 41 times greater.; 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that from the point:of view of income facts 
such as the above may be cited, in recent decades the transformations in the 
economic structure have undeniably had an impact on the structure of the occupa-
tional stratification system, which has meant mobility and social transformation 
of undeniable importance and, which, in addition, have certainly had impact on the 
forms of social coexistence. 
Ample reference has been made above to the demographic changes, the changes 
in the occupational structure and the influence of the educational transformation. 
Those processes and'othér accompanying processes have brought about the internal 
alteration of thè différent Social groups and the creation of newsgroups, all of 
which forms thë> current social s Irrati fi cation of the region, and in Which, process 
it should bé emphasized that, when'a clearly urban population is formed, the 
priority social demands will not basically.-be -as in the récent past- demands for 
"integration into urban life" but for^distributive policies which will correct the 
urban inequalities themselves; in addition ¡> a fact that a growing percentage of 
thé population' xè having access to basic levels of education indicates that there 
will be greater homogeneity in such demands. 
• '• "• • - -..- . /In some . • : 
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In some countries the different types of changes that occurred resulted in 
social mobility processes and even diffèrent relative weights of social groups which 
brought about the replacement by one group of the, other in terms of position 
occupied in the global power system. The region has not been free from, political-
social alterations which introduced radical changes into the stratification system. 
In others, the alterations did not change the relationship among the groups, but 
it did give rise to ascending or descending mobility processes and important 
internal alterations within each stratum. In still others, the concentration of 
power in certain institutional communities brought about significant changes in the 
composition of social power, either by gradual linkage between those communities 
and the pre-existing higher social groups, or because the power made possible the 
insertion of others. 
In some cases, and under favourable economic circumstances., social mobility 
processes were recorded which enabled a greater number of persons to be incorpo-
rated into the middle and high levels of the social stratification pyramid, due 
to the expansion and differentiation of the corresponding positions. In other 
cases, and sometimes together with the above, mobility processes took place in 
sectors closer to the social base. However, since all this was linked to more or 
less favourable economic processes, it might be now wondered what will be the future 
scenario of the processes of change in social stratification in a generalized 
context of recession. 
2. The impact of the crisis, its effect on youth 
Everyone is aware of the fact that at the beginning of the 1980s, Latin America is 
confronting its worst economic crisis since the great depression of the 1930s. 
The indicators register marked decreases in global production, an increase in the 
already-high open unemployment and underemployment rates, acute inflationary 
processes, severe balance-of-payments crises, abrupt decreases in international 
reserves and an increase in the external debt and of the payment of interests on 
that debt at untenable levels. Many of the anti-recessionary policies to date 
have been reflected in programmes of contraction which imply devaluations, 
reduction of social services and decrease in public spending and employment. 
For the purposes of this document, it should be pointed out that althbugh 
the effects are more or less serious according to the social stratum involved, 
within each stratum certainly the most affected would be young people. The 
decrease in economic activity -if there is not a radical change in policies in 
that area- will mean a drop in supply of jobs and therefore the non-absorption 
into the labour market of young people seeking to «iter it and who are reaching 
unprecedented levels in absolute terms. In addition, if an attempt is made to act 
in terms of checking or reducing social services, this will affect the young 
people who have resorted to this sector as a source of work, and especially young 
educated women, who, as we have seen, represent a considerable percentage in 
services such as education and health. 
If there is a radical drop in urban activities, such as some data appear to 




Furthermore, because competition for jobs is increasing at a time when 
available posts are decreasing¿ an effect of downward compression is produced, -
which accentuates the existing trends and forces those who have a higher educar 
tionai level to opt for lower-prestige occupations, driving out those with 
relatively less education, and thus on down to those young people who have only a 
rudimentary education, a situation which would practically exclude them from the 
job market. 
The economic crisis can very often make itself felt as both a political and 
social crisisj and if that occurs, the conflicts would tend to worsen. If youth 
are the most affected, it is to be assumed that the generational conflict is one 
of the forms it may take, but the dimension of social legitimacy can also be 
called into question, if account is taken of the fact that the legitimacy of power 
relations has tended to rely and is relying more and more on the efficiency of the 
economic system. The latter aspect of the crisis may relate to the direct 
relations between the social groups and classes and may also drift towards a 
weakening of the legitimacy of the State, to the extent that it; has long been a 
tradition for the State to take responsibility for economic management. 
It is quite possible, therefore, that a demand may arise, which may be more 
or less conflictive, for redynamization of the economy, in which the distinctive 
elements would be: the demand for a social vocation, whose most concrete form 
would be pressure for redistribution, even in terms of the costs and burdens of 
the crisis; a development Vocation, which will demand economic.dynamism and, in 
addition, a vocation for autonomys as a correction of the extreme external 
dependence, which may be ej$>ressed; as a demand for new forms of internal develop-
ment and probably with ^industrialization objectives. 
With regard to youth, two key topics arise in this context: the possible 
ability of youth to apply pressure for the alternative style of development to be 
directed towards satisfying needs. This may be problematic if it is considered 
that the prevailing model, in its successful phase, distorted the type of needs 
considered to be important, especially through consumption. And second, the 
change which youth may bring about in the definition of values, which are expressed 
as social needs, is a crucial aspect. 
Furthermore, the 'fact that the alternative development which may come about, 
should mean a development of the person and not only of thingsj will be closely . 
connected not only with alienation from "consumerism" but also with the degree of 
creativity and satisfaction achieved in productive activity or economic activity 
in general, which will depend, among other factors, on the connection that is 
achieved between levels and forms of education and the incorporation not only into 
the economic system but into the political and social system as a whole. 
It is obvious that all the problems described will occur in specific forms 
in the different countries of the region, due to the structural heterogeneity of 1 
the latter; however, it can be assumed that they will generally be present in one 
form or another. ; . 
/VIII. THE 
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VIII® THE UNCERTAINTIES.OF THE FUTURE 
1. Lack of a clear idea of the direction of the change 
In Latin America, the years following the Second World War were not only marked 
by objective transformations in the economic and social structure in the majority 
of the countries, but also by a strong awareness of this change. Questions con-
cerning what was changing and the nature of that change, despite the ideological 
differences, appeared to have some common replies. Furthermore, the question from 
what point and in what direction change was occurring was resolved in the idèa of 
transition between the traditional society and modern society, or, in a fuller 
and more flexible form, in the idea that the change was taking place from an 
agrarian society to an industrial or urban society. The former was based on the 
economic and social structure of the plantation and the latter on that of the 
business firm. 
Today, we lack such expressive images as the previous ones, and perhaps our 
collective awareness of the change is more diffuse than the preceding one. There 
is often some concern with regard to the problems which the previous process did 
not succeed in fully resolving or even worsened, such as poverty, marginality, the 
social distribution of benefits, and many others, but with no implication of the 
awareness of a transition to another stage or situation. Expressed schematically, 
the awareness of the problems is outweighing the awareness of change. 
In a somewhat confused way, therefore, there is a conviction that the society 
of the future will be different from that of. the present, although attempts to 
indicate precisely how those differences will manifest themselves have not been 
successful. The concerns appear to assume three positions which are interrelated 
but stress different aspects. The first relates to technology and its transfor-
mation, where the problem lies in. the new skills required to make proper use of it, 
but also in the type of societal organization those skills presume, to the extent 
that all technique is a form of human action. The second believes that a 
questioning of values is taking place, the causes of which are multiple and complex, 
which fulfilled' a fundamental role in the current style, of civilization, but which 
would be reaching the end of their validity. The third position is represented by 
those who believe that innovation lies in the emergence of new societal models, 
deriving from deep-seated needs and not resolved by the known models of society. 
But whatever the form in which a different society and future are envisaged, 
the motivating factor would appear more to be a dissatisfaction with the present 
than a joyous attraction to the future. Consequently, it has been emphasized that 
the search for an alternative style of development has been hastened because of the 
dissatisfaction produced by the prevailing model. . 
It may be inevitable for the time being for our picture of the change to be 
confused and for our feeling of crisis with respect to the present situation to 
become more acute precisely for this reason. Nevertheless, what is important in a 
process of change is mainly the transformation of the social structure and 
especially the emergence of a new social stratification and the creation of new 
ways of living. An- analysis of the changes in the former and of its foreseeable 
trends, as can be observed in the youth of today, can provide scane clues for the 
interpretation of the elements of the future change. 
/The concerns 
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The concerns expressed above also apply to cultural phenomena, which, it is 
claimed, follow too closely upon the transformations taking place at the level of 
social and economic structures. It can plausibly be argued that important pheno-
mena of changé took place during, the. urbanization, industrialization and moderni-
zation processes referred to above, at different times for each country. In such 
cases, the cultural options appeared tò be those implied by the difference between 
rural culture and modern urban culture. The contrasting societal archetypes, and 
therefore the cultural figures linked to them, were those represented by the 
plantation and the firm, respectively; the structural transition, therefore, 
corresponded to a cultural transition. The problems consisted of learning how much 
was change and transformation and how much continuity. In the current situation, 
the picture of the future is much less precise, although this does not mean that 
criticism of tradition is not helpful and that there is not a process, although a 
confused one, of dissolution of certain standards. 
Probably the phrase best describing the situation is the old idea of a 
"cultural malaise", and therefore the presence of a relative confusion and 
disorientation. 
In such situations a positive attitude often arises, of critical review or 
revalidation of the cultural origin ór source to which it is necessary to return 
in order to find an orientation. What this means is that, although in other 
periods thé clarity of the picture of the future made it possible to form clear 
judgements on the value or lack of value of the existing culture, at the present 
time the relationships would appear to have reversed, since an attempt is being 
made to postulate dimensions of the future on the basis of a cultural judgement. 
It is therefore possible to hope that what will predominate is critical youth : 
rather than youth which conceive themselves as the carriers of an already nearly 
pre-rfigured future. -
It is difficult to; discuss the current relationship of youth to the culture 
because there is not much specific informétión available; however, reference should 
be.made to some of the problems observed, Oriè of ̂ them-is that-of cultural demand, 
which is obviously not only a request for access to the advantages of the culture, 
although it is clear that this element will 'continue to:be important. .There will 
probably be a change in the demand, deriving from the critical attitude referred 
to above, and in addition, the culture will probably tend to be conceived as a 
conscious ideal rather than merely thé existing one, ïhe culture can then prefer-
ably present itself as a form of consciousness and the key problem to be solved 
will be that Of how thé individual cònsciousneés and social consciousness can be 
joined culturally. Basic phenomena for Latin American countries, such as the idea 
of freedom, will have to be elaborated in terms of the relationship between those 
forms of consciousness. The search for individual spiritual autonomy requires 
reflection on its relationship to the community and the type of manifestation which 
that autonomy may find in a very concrete form of society. And it should not be 
thought that these ideas are very'obstrusej since they constitute the basis for 
options of democracy, participation and social responsibility. 
With regard to specifically Latin Amèricàn topics, one fact which should be 
taken into account is the obvious superimpositidn of cultures, an area in which 
some countries have not been able to achieve a'true integration and in which some 
/cultures tended 
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cultures tended to be excluded or subdued. The problem has been becoming more 
acute in recent years, and rather than being thought of in terms of a smooth and 
even cultural integration, different cultural principles are considered to be in 
conflict and even compétition in the attempt to lay the groundwork for the nation..... 
Possibly as a result of this heterogeneity of cultures is the feeling, so 
often referred to by Latin Americans, that we are dealing with what is formless, 
undone, unfinished or still being formed. As expressed by Octavio Paz, in our 
Latin America, the act of being is almost one of intellectual violence. Building 
an identity appears to be one of the most serious cultural challenges for youth, 
especially if account is taken of the fact that in recent years they have been 
exposed, mainly through consumption, to foreign patterns and models. 
2, Concern far youth as a reflection of uncertainty 
At certain times some kinds of juvenile behaviour, which we consider to be more 
or less eccentric, attract the attention of society as a whole and require some 
explanation. In other cases, doubts concerning the society itself as a whole lead 
to concern With the topic of youth. The latter would appear to be the current 
situation, in which an attempt is being made to understand an uncertain future 
through the current béhaviour of youth. The uncertainty of the future goes hand-
in-hand with a diffuse awareness of crisis, where the continuity of what exists is 
not assured, and even more, we have no exact certainty of its value. As a result, 
when society is at a turning point it begins to be concerned about its youth. 
Juvenile behaviour itself often gives signs of crisis phenomena, since the social 
standards prevailing up to that point appear to be going through a process of 
dissolution and even destruction. It is a question of well-known historical 
phenomena, of destruction of tradition through the eruption of phenomena of 
structural change or of new events removing the basis for habitual behaviour, or of 
processes involving internal decay of tradition or of exhaustion of the values 
which sustained it. 
It is in the area of education that the problems appear with most intensity. 
Why can the future -which is equivalent to saying youth- not simply be moulded 
according to the image of the present; it is obvious that such a doubt arises when 
one is doubting oneself. In the search for an option, it is feasible to resort to 
the models provided by other societies, which are supposed to be better than our own 
or more advanced, and this has often been attempted and been done, but by a strange 
paradox would seem to be the least advisable solution at the present time. It 
should be borne in mind that the societies which we call the "more developed" 
societies are becoming increasingly distrustful of what they have achieved, and 
some of their segments even believe that the less developed societies have managed 
to keep the secret of more valid lifestyles than those which they themselves have 
achieved. 
Though there are doubts concerning the true value of the existing models, 
there is also distrust of a simple leap of the imagination towards the proposal 
of a Utopia. It is true that an attempt is being made today to recover the value 
of the Utopia, but also -although it may appear to be a contradiction in terms-
there has been an attempt to give it the characteristic of concreteness. It is 
/a question. 
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a question, say its proponents, of imagining the future, on the basis of the present 
reality, but not in order to subject it to the latter, but rather as an opportunity 
to change it. Much of the present is fixed-and inevitable, but there is also a 
need for responding to the present in a future, perspective. From a. demographic 
point of view, the mere intensification of the existing trends shows that to a 
great extent, it is. not a question of finding formulas for adapting to them., but 
for correcting and changing than;. the same occurs with tbe trends of the economic .. 
structure or with the existing type of social and cultural development. Diagnoses 
and predictions at the current time are.pointing to.the.needs for change arid : 
transformation more than the possibility of continuity between., the present, and the 1 
future.-- ............... 
Expectations for change are generally placed in young people, because almost 
by definition they are. supposed, to. be less, tied to the past and to. the present than 
adult generations. But' this idea of youth as a "tabula rasa" is not very definite 
or even appropriate. • Elements, of the, future, unlike those, of the present, do not 
necessarily have to be a negating imaginative.effort. The dimensions of a different 
future are very of ten found, in history itself,, as .non-realized or. simply repressed 
elements. The role of youth, in addition to7their .creative, .capacity, also lies 
in their capacity, to reassume and realize the ,other./ei^eats'Qf. history, -and "... 
especially those of their own history-i which up to now existed only as. a possibility. 
IX. IMPORTANCE OP' GENERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. IN A \ 
SOCIETY IN TRANSFORMATION . . . 
1. The relationship between generations . 
The time of change which Latin America is experiencing, as confused and uncertain 
as it is, requires social protagonists. We are not trying to postulate an 
exclusive role for youth in such a process, but we do want to call attention to a 
few facts which, should be borne in mind. The existence of a certain amount of 
conflicts or tensions between the different generations making lip society at a 
given moment is.relatively common® Juvenile behaviours are often explained as the 
result of a certain moral rebellion created by the. discrepancy between the values 
declared and transmitted in socialization and the values -or the real behaviour-
manifested by those in power and by.tbe adult generation in.general. Such a 
"rebellion against parents", to use the psychoanalytic terminology, may be accepted 
as a more or less normal event with not very dangerous consequences, since the 
acceptance of reality is the step subsequent to the appearance of that symptom. 
Defiance would come to be a kind of growth trauma, but as such, surmountable. The 
situation is different when, the adult generation •itself lacks trust in its norma-
tive guidelines and ways of constituting social relationships. The present time, 
as has been implied, has a large measure of such characteristicss aggravated by 
the influence ,of the crisis , the repercussions qf_ which are,not only economic but 
extend to the .social, political and cultural areas. 7 
The problem tends to become more acute if it,is, postulated that the relation-
ship between the youth and adult generations is. acquiring a particular direction in 
the region. Given the marked increase in education in the last 20 years, young 
/people are 
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people are much more educated than adults. Although most adults above 50 years of 
age are illiterate, young people are literate and for some categories of youth, 
the distance between the education of the parents and their own covers a range 
from incomplete primary education through a university degree. In addition, the 
form of insertion into economic activity is changing; it has been shown how large 
groups of young people are preferring to incorporate themselves into the service 
sector, in which organizational rationality and modern technology are playing a 
growing role. 
It is among young women that the most marked changes are being recorded in 
the area of education, rates of participation in economic activity and greater 
differences between the adult and youth generations with respect to insertion into 
manual or intellectual occupations. 
The expansion of education and the transformation of occupational structures 
have brought about high mobility between different age groups, with a very high 
rate of change between generations hardly 10 years apart. 
Another fact which should be pointed out, besides the already referred-to 
distance between parents and children with respect to educational levels, and which 
can be influential in the relationship between the generations, is what could be 
termed "modernization distance"* The transformation -not only technological- as 
regards the degree of modernity has been accelerated in recent years, and the rate 
of change is probably increasing still more. The family, which was the vehicle 
of modernization par excellence, is encountering difficulties in fulfiling such 
functions, since adults often possess neither the skill nor the knowledge required 
for carrying out new functions important in modern life. In addition, for various 
reasons, the paternalistic Latin American culture is ceasing to be as solid as it 
was, so that socialization is tending.to take place among peers and, if not a total 
break, at least a certain estrangement is being created from the older generation. 
The dynamic of the change caused young people to have an image of potential-
ity, growth and mobility. They have been the main participants in the modernization 
processes, as distorted as the latter may have been. Young people have experienced 
rapid urbanization, considerable integration into the mass.communications systems, 
into broadened forms of participation in consumption -independently of the negative 
features which this assumed in some cases- massification of education, the 
importance of the presence of women in the society, which among other things means 
that the young generation has double weight in the society of today, since women 
are becoming more and more active in it, while in the adult generation men were 
often the only active ones. 
Nevertheless, because of the effects; of the crisis, it is feasible to assume 
that the rate of such transformations will decrease considerably. In any social 
process, the abrupt transformation of collective states of mind based on great 
expectations, to shared frustrations, has had an effect on the types of social 
mobilization of the affected group. 
/2. Options 
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2. Options and generational conflict . ; 
The current situation will'certainly highlight the theme of options with respect 
to alternative styles of development. Perhaps it is predictable for the discussion 
of alternatives to take on the form of a conflict, although -not necessarily for it 
to be extremely acute; The conflict may assume the form of a generational conflict, 
and it would not be the first time that that happened in oûr countries. It must be 
foreseen that not only will different options exist, but that in addition the 
mechanisms and institutions through which the change had been accustomed to take 
place, will appear to be somewhat questioned. In that case, the conflict; with 
youth would acquire a double dimension, conflict over a particular option and 
conflict with the institutional political system in force. 
Conflict over the political system may acquire particular importance. 
Progress at the educational level, particularly observable among youth, make it 
foreseeable that there will be a lessèr impact of certain kinds of political 
mobilization in Latin America, such as those provided in the past by charismatic 
leaders. Modes of participation will probably relate to forms of organization. 
Nevertheless, in few Latin American countries the presence of a modern political 
party structure may be observed, and even a certain tendency, towards perpetuation 
of the traditional parties, often with difficulties in creating forms more reprer 
sentative of thé new social forces which have been emerging. As we know, it was; 
and is fairly common for the party structure to be based on a system of leadership 
of noteworthy persons, close to "caudillismo" and power groups were constituted-, 
whose conception of politics -imposed by those, circumstances- o^t jn tended -Xgyasda 
manipulation.' The political-juridical institutional structure, also freqiieijtl̂ ,-r 
presents problems; it was generally designed to give cfëcount of phenomena 9f slow 
transformation and even in seme cases to moderate. the speed of the changes, whepce 
its difficulties in responding to profound social» changes aid the danger of crisis 
in which it is finding itself-to the extent that the political process is becoming 
radicalized. 
The difficulties, of participation, the feeling that the existing: political 
system might nqt Show the flexibility necessary to meet the emergencies of the 
current economic situations may cause young people to have an attitude of 
breaking with thé" traditional political system, the repercussions of which are 
difficult to predict. " , 
' X. YOUTH AND THEIR ROLE ¿IN PROCESSES OF CHANGE 
1. Youth as a social movement 15/ 
The problem of options concerning the futurë implies not only the need for 
possible orientations of that future, but also an attempt to understand the 
probable behaviour of the different social groups<with; respect to it. It always 
appears debatable to designate an age group such as youth as a social actor, 
since as a group it is quite heterogeneous, and there are other dimensions, such 
as the concrete fact that young people are objectively part of specific social 
/groups which 
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groups which make it still more difficult to assume them to be a whole, so that it 
is preferable to refer to working-class.youth, rural youth, students, etc. 
Nevertheless, there are some reasons for considering youth in Latin America 
to be a social movement, although a specific group -students-has most often been 
its protagonist; however, they have done so by expressing the demands of youth in 
general and attempting to assume the representation of all those sharing that 
status. 
Furthermore -with no lack of conflicts and perhaps as a result of them-, 
a positive validation of youth may be observed in Latin American society. This is 
influenced by the nearly inevitable.observance of their numeric significance, but 
what is more, the assumption of a certain identity between the nature of society 
as a whole and youth as such. The theme of Latin America as the "young continent" 
compared with European societies or other cultures,. the idea of its being, the 
"continent of the future" could not but influence the formation of a positive image 
of the role of youth. In addition, for reasons which cannot be dwelt on.here, 
the intellectuals in Latin America have a role comparable to -or which in. the. 
words of don José Medina Echavarria, would be the counterfigure of- what in other 
areas is performed by the "entrepreneur". The intellectual combined innovative 
ideas and proposals for a better social arrangement; the image of ah Andres Bello 
has continued to be paradigmatic. This.positive vision of the intellectual was 
transferred to the University and people connected with the University who, 
although they may be in conflict, still perform a function which society as a whole 
is grateful to them for; they are the enlightened consciousness of that society 
and the bearers of the new ideas which help form the future. For-, diis reason it 
is always disturbing -although not infrequent- to place a ban on the University. 
Youth in short, represented most of the time by students, is accepted by the society 
as a legitimate expression of attempts towards change and transformation. 
Furthermore, in the history of Latin America the objectives of the youth 
movement, as a social movement, have been those of change and social transformation, 
and this movement's nature of proposal should be stressed, since if a proposal is 
involved, it is a conscious one, and the youth movement has attempted to affirm 
that what unites thém, more than a oommon structural condition, is a link of 
consciousness. 
The dimension of the conflict appears to be important in the formation of a 
consciousness, and although the conflict often acquires a generational nature, it 
has not stopped at that but has called into question the entire existing social 
organization; Youth achieves the status of a social movement to the extent that 
it has been and is capable of producing social and; cultural orientations, on the 
basis of its own status and activity, but still more, to the extent that it manages 
to infuse its practices with meaning; For this reason, youth appears to be a , 
historic actor, guided by normative orientations, in other words, by a project, 
and this implies that their behaviour is not only the mechanical result of the 
situations in which they exist, but that it is also culturally-oriented behaviour, 
hence the value of their ideologies and the significance of analysing them. 
/Thus understanding 
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Thus understanding the youth raovëmèiit '-appéars to have a double relation,- . , 
on the one haftd to the type 'of -specifiG'conflict confronted and on the other, in 
relation to the.project or option being proposed. It is in these terms that the 
movement :áefines its own: iâ.ënti:tyy thè types'of-conflicts in;which it is situated 
andtthe óptiópjof meaning'that it attributeS: to its own action 
"The^yôùth^moVement,'-as a sóciál movement, constitutes a type of social 
action, which is carried out in the name of a directly-involved sector of society 
and which possesses a certain level of organization; this makes the conflict 
. become more precise and the movement attàin a certain integration. In Latin 
América in general, the level of organization is provided by the student organi-
zations, although other expressions may-be found¿ such as* for example, parties 
or partisan youth. In the dimension of thé conflict an adversary tends to be ; 
designated, perhaps represented bjr a-social group -for example, the oligarchy-
although it is very often defined in-mor&: abstract terms, such as "imperialism'.', 
or "reactionism". Most of the time the Conflict attempts to present itself as a 
problem concerning society as a whole, which enables the behaviour of youth to 
be. distinguished from that'of a pressure group.• 
2. The youth social movement in the history; of Latin America 
Concern over thé- future behaviour of young people in the region takes on ..special, 
interest if it is considered that they have very often performed an important /v, 
rolé. In tracing the history of the youth movement in Latin America, we find .. 
sortie background for stimulating thought on its role. A brief review of its course 
of development may be useful for better understanding the possible forros of its 
future action. ' • - " • ' • • • ••,••• M---. • ''• -..•••• ... 
a) Youth in the 192Í0s and the Latin American consciousness .-,. 
Thus understood,' the Latin American youth movement has a history which may 
be.dated from the movement known as the University Reform, which originated, at- .. 
Cordoba (Argentina) in 1918 aid which managed to extend to most of the countries 
of the region extraordinarily rapidly. It should be pointed out that in the 
1920s, there were not only youth movements of the university-type, but that at 
least in the case of Brazil in 1924, and in Chile at about the same time, there 
were military youth movements, which in the former country gave rise to the 
so-called "revolution of the Heutenants". : 
Jîhat Should be pointed out,'more than the historical particularities of, the 
youth movement in each country» are the themes which, appear to be closely : 
connected with the youth''movement;'one of them was the conflict; with the oligarchy, 
whose leading group capacity and status was questioned and the negative features 
of its historical actión stréssed. The second theme was that of the.Nation, 
and in that case reférétícé was madè to the fact that large social .sectors did 
not appear to be integrated into it. It was also stressed that the phenomenon 
of imperialism made so-called national sovereignty: an illusion. A third theme 
was that of the people, with which an attempt was made to assert its claims and 
in some cases to base the new elements of the Nation on the values of the masses. 
The idea of a Nation based on the people, autonomous and with endogenous values 
was opposed to the oligarchic, excluding Nation which tended to favour foreign 
/ways. The 
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ways. The demand for democracy also appeared to be significant, enabled the 
oligarchic political form to be opposed and opened the path towards the partici-
pation of the people. In the last place, mention should be made of the emergence 
of a Latin American consciousness which emphasized a common identity beyond the 
traditional differences and conflicts among countries. 
According to the most common interpretations of the youth movement of the 
1920s, it expressed the political demand of the middle sectors. Some themes, 
such as the anti-oligarchical conflict and the demand for democracy, endorse that 
interpretation, despite the fact that youth and especially university youth do not 
accept that they are member's of the middle class and their criticisms of the middle 
class are often as virulent as their criticisms of the oligarchy. They prefer to 
designate themselves as intellectuals or "intelligentsia", attempting in these 
terms, like their Russian counterparts, by whom they are influenced, to stress 
their rootlessness and condition beyond the immediate interests of specific social 
classes and groups. 
The importance of literature in the formation of the youth ideology is of: 
interest. On the one hand the pursuit of literaturé attracts young people, but 
in addition, a renovated literature develops certain topics which are essential 
to them, such as a new understanding of Latin- America, which is discovered in its 
immensity and in its popular literary characters, who cease to be picturesque and 
become protagonists. 
There is also a strong generational awareness, expressed ir> an idealization 
of youth arid in a validation of the youth status, which even extbads to the entire 
continent which, in opposition to old Europe, considers itself to be the bearer 
of the future because it is the young continent. 
b) The problem of political option. 
The second period in the historical formation of the youth movement occurred 
between the crisis of 1929 and the beginning of the Second World -War in 1939. One 
topic which had been examined earlier, as the result of the horrors of the First 
World War, takes on a very generalized dimension. This is the crisis of 
liberalism, whose not only political but also economic effectiveness was refuted 
by the effects of the crisis of 1929, 
What is important is that there was a high degree of politization in those 
years and that in the case of our topic it related more to the political option of 
youth than to youth autonomy. The key point lies in the role of the different 
social classes and the type of relationship between them; it is in that context 
that the space of youth and particularly students is defined. Although some 
continue to emphasize the youth-people identity, others are placing it in doubt 
and trying to stress the class situation of the different youth sectors. 
A few historical events took place during the period and were influential, 
among them and as an example, the Cardenista period in Mexico, which strengthened 
the ideology of the possibility of national revolution as a valid option for 
Latin America. In addition, the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia caused 
the awakening of a national consciousness in the military sectors and youth 
milieux, which would have an effect some years later. 
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We cannot fail to mention, in the last'place, the impact of the.Spanish 
Civil War, the tragedy of which would intensify the awareness of.the political 
options referred to. ? 
c) Youth and modernization ;- ; .. 
A third period is that of the young war and ̂postwar generation. The joint 
participation of the United States and the Soviet•Union in the cqnfiict attenuated 
ideological çqnflicté'i ;but there also'took place during;.the period a series, o 
already well-known structural transformations* such as the urbanization, and in . " 
some countries, industrialization processes. The result of such transformations 
was the presence of tKè massés, which became a key factor, from that period on} in 
political terras it meant the emergence of populism, .and in some cases that compli-
cated the old order of'workervstudent unity. 
The period in itself is quite complex; progressivism was^followed by the . 
cold war, and democratic beginnings were again succeeded by authoritarian forms. 
For some, the les sóli Waéf that an attempt at reform which retained certain, formal 
democratic dimehsions,~'was quite weak in the face of . the reaction of. the groups, 
affected, both internal and external. For others^ the experience;indicated that 
it was necessary to bê still mòre cautious• an démoderate in the reforms, so as not 
to give cause for a reaction.* ' --
But» in addition to the global political processes, special mention'sKouIcT 
be made in the second half òf the 1950s, of the .impact of the ideology of moder-
nization, linked to the Structural changes mentioned. In the universities,..thip 
implied a tendency to exalt the Value of prof e ss ion ali zat ion an;d the belief, that 
the universities as such could play a key role in the modernization process and 
have influence in it. The attraction for modernity influenced not only young 
students but also young people who were incorporated into the world of industry 
or modernized tertiary activities. 
The role and future of Latin-America also tended to be perceived in other 
terms; the option was to become integrated positively into the modern and 
develope d world, . . . 
The ideological changes did not take place only among the students; the 
industrialization and urbanization processes mentioned above brought about the 
transformation òf groups of workers and definitely increased the number of young 
people incorporated into industrial activity; for many of thon the main than e was 
that of incorporation into the modern world-and its symbols,, so that a certain 
ideological change was produced, especially in terms of the perception of an 
identity of interests and situations with; the middle sectors, and it was often , 
not difficult for them to perceive themselves a?--such, 
d) Tbe conflicts of moderniza1tion 
The mpderhizatiòn pròcesÈr which took place in many countries not only 
accentuated contradictions regarding the •more traditional sectors, but caused 
conflicts, further on within tt e Modernization itself Furthermore, opposing 
political, economic and-social^ ópticWs :were coming into .being, such as the Cuban 
/Revolution, the 
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Revolution, the Alliance for Progress, :the Revolution in Freedom, and others. The 
debate related to the alternatives of development and modernization, but was also 
connected with the conflicts of the latter. 
In fact, modernization not only accentuated the Well-known structural 
heterogeneity of Latin America but, since it took place in a context of persistence 
of traditional dimensions -not only economic, but also social and political-
tended in many cases to become distorted. Thus, although some aspects of modern-
ization were accepted, others, which were concomitant or necessary for its proper 
development, were not. For example, the development of a modern industry implies 
the emergence of a workers' group with the ability to organize and express its 
demands and, for its part, the management sector must change its behaviour and the 
type of relationship it has with its workers; often the positive aspects of the 
existence of a modern industry were accepted, but an attempt was made.to maintain 
the traditional form of management-worker relationship or there was simply a 
tendency to deny the validity of a workers' organization. 
Difficulties were also emerging among university staff and students. For 
certain professions, the occupational possibilities were no longer so clear or at 
least appeared to have declined in comparison to others. One of the forms taken 
by the conflict was in terms of the debate between university modernization or 
reform, but in which there were different conceptions of the relationship between 
the university and society. The reformists took up the old thesis of revolution-
izing society through the university, attempting.in this way to recover a key role 
for themselves and for the university as a whole.: The modernizers stressed an 
adaptation of the development process and a function of stimulus for: it ¿ and 
unquestionably spoke for a great number of persons who had found positive and 
relatively stable forms of insertion into the undeniable development process which 
the majority of the societies of the region were experiencing. 
It is interesting that a third world consciousness, which had. a significant 
impact on youth groups, was attractive precisely during the modernization process; 
to a certain extent it is indicative of the conflicts which were being created and 
of the set of contradictions which the process itself was emphasizing. 
: Another extremely interesting ideological phenomenon was the effect of the 
processes of revolutionary change on power, which, because they took place in 
Latin America once again emphasized the protagonist role of youth, given the 
importance of the youth sector in those processes. Some widely-diffused themes, 
were: the exemplary nature which the behaviour of youth was supposed to assume; 
their rebellion was mainly to be an example for other social groups; a vanguard 
function was also assumed for young people., the broader formulation of which was 
the idea of the new man, which youth was to foreshadow. The foundation,-of youth 
behaviour was a strong emphasis on the ethical and moral dimensions, which took 
precedence over more specific determining factors of youth status. 
/3.Possible 
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n ,3» Possible themes of the' current youth movement 
This brief account of the history of the Latin -American youth -movement indicates ... 
that it is not inappropriate to think of the youth of the region as a social 
movement, in thé sense that they are not only attempting to achieve .self-identity 
but that they are1 also considered to be the bearers of a process, of social change. 
To this extent they are political actors. It is true that they are not. a -
homogenous group or one having a single ideology, but neither is.any : social move-
ment. The topics which Latin Aœrican:.society. .as a who-le-has raise,d, j^volution, de-
mocracy, modernization, development and others, have a privileged, area .of discussion 
among'youth. With due regard for the differences student groups especially 
constitute a kind of ideological consciousnessof society, like intellectuals in 
other cultures and societies. The diffusion, development and in sojn.e cases 
elaboration of idéologies is closely linked to them, and this role, turns them into 
a key group. Not only do they » as young people, adopt .certain values and [behaviour 
orientations which they will transform into-concrete actions when they later: on 
become adults, but they are influential as young people. It is not only a question 
of what will happèn with the young people of today when they become . adults.,, but 
also of what the young people of thé .near ;.future. will be like. In this way . 
viewing youth as a social movement proves-to be useful. 
A review of the history of the.youth movement emphasizes the fact that» 
déspite the particular features^ of each 'country of the region, there is a strong 
coincidence and similarity among the topics which have been of concern to young 
people* It might be thought that this is not the current situation and, on the — 
contrary ,-that diversity is tënding to increase, A simple glance at the. Current \ 
political situation; shows thé'different options-caning-into play in groups of . u 
countries "such as, for example, those of Central America, those of the Caribbean 
region, with their specific features in the English- or French-speaking Caribbean, 
the Andean countries, the Southern Cone, etc.; nevertheless, some general problems 
may be discerned. •"• -
a) The democratic compromise ^ 
With respect to the role of youth in relation to the democratic option, 
whatever the institutiohîal form and modality it may .adopt, the most important 
question is the social vâliie which the young people attach to such an alternative 
and the degree of realism with which they raise their demands. The points of r • • 
intërèst would be an awareness of the structural conditions of democracy., not in 
the sensé of simply -accepting them as limits to democracy, but as .'a need, for change 
in order to carry democracy further; It might also be asked what thedemands and 
role of young péople Would be in relation to the deepening and-spreading of 
democracy, both in the area of the economy and in that of society and the political 
system. The forms of structurings-economic relations are most often far from being 
democratic forms, not-only in terms: of the distribution of economic benefits, but 
also in terms of the modes of organization of the production itself. 
At the social level, the experience of the family organization, relations 
between social groups and sectors and forms of socialization, including the formal 
educational system, are often very far from being a democratic experience. 
Societies which institutionally acknowledge the value of democracy often deny it 
in the practice of their social relationships, and youth are in fact particularly 
/sensitive to 
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sensitive to this contradiction. The political system, itself, the basis for 
democratic organization, needs to be made more democratic, and there is no escaping 
the fact that the forms of real participation in party and political structures are 
very often far from being the most efficient. 
Furthermore, under the operating conditions of the prevailing type of 
development, whose tendency towards concentration is widely recognized, democratic 
demands cannot escape that fact and often make it into one of the most frequent 
themes of the.social: and political conflict. 
In the well-known formulation of Dr. Prebisch,16/ centre-periphery relations 
imply that, peripheral development appears as a limited development, but with a 
strong imitative character, both as regards techniques and forms of consumption, 
and also with respect to institutions, ideas and ideologies. A level of aspira-
tions is therefore spread which, due to the concentrating nature of the economy, 
are not satisfied. He stresses that the gap between aspirations and capacity of 
response does not indicate a lag but is inherent to the type of peripheral 
development. The exaggerated imitation of forms of consumption appears markedly 
in the higher strata, who attempt to concentrate surpluses in order to have access 
to them. Peripheral development therefore, becomes excluding and gives rise to a 
privileged consumer society. However, strong political and social pressures to 
share the surplus are created, and are brought to bear mainly on the State, the 
redistributive mechanism par excellence. 
The phenomenon raises the contradiction.between the concentrating style and 
the democratic society; this imposes the need to seelc a change ox ótyle. There 
is undeniable pressure by certain forms of consumption and their diffusion among 
different social strata. This phenomenon may be still greater among youth. Whose 
exposure to consumer pressure.is a recognized fact in Latin America.17/ 
It may be pointed out with no fear of exaggeration that on the one hand, 
the difficulty lies in the defective relationship between type of development and 
demand, which obliges us to think of the true solution as being the Search for 
more efficient forms of development, but also to think about the existence of a 
certain alienation in consumption. However, the latter arises from more basic 
alienations; one of than is alienation-in work, in which thè lack of satisfaction 
compels a change or the search for one, in other areas, such as consumption. An 
alteration in consumer interests requires recovering the meaning of work and the 
social relationships which work involves. The demand for democratization 
represents not only a demand for a more egalitarian and broader access to consump-
tion', but also a demand for transformation of the most structural forms of the 
social relationship. This topic is closely linked to an "otheir development" 
option which would mean both a break with alienation in work, consumption and the 
form adopted by social relations. 
b) The role of youth with respect to the topic of integration and the 
Nation-State 
The current economic, situation is once again raising the urgency of Latin 
American co-operation and integration as a positive response to the set of problems 
raised by the crisis of the 1980s. It must be borne in mind that such an objective 
is being raised at a time when national problems are difficult and still socially 
/conflict!ve. Iti 
- 40 -
conflietive.: In many cases- the immediately previous economic option meant an 
accentuation of internal differentiations, both at the level "of stratification -
and of culture, symbols and values. There also occurred a certain trans formation 
in the functions of the State apparatuswhich affected the national integration 
processes given the undeniable role that the latter traditionally fulfils in that 
aspect, Thus this new posing of Latin American integration is taking place at a 
difficult moment for the Nation-State. 
Attempting to link these topics to the rôle of youth might appear to be 
arbitrary, but it is not so arbitrary if we realize that one of the key dimensions 
is "the existence of an ideology capable of 'revitalizing the topic of Latin American 
integration, and in this connection, as the very history of the youth movement ': 
shows, the latter can make an important contribution. 
In order for a Latin American consciousness to be formed, it must be 
supported by certain institutions which almost by definition are Titore open than: 
those which have specific national or local concerns. Such is; the case of the 
Latin American university, which has obviously had to respond to national 
requirements and has 'also been "open to the world". It is also a well-known fact 
that university themes have been very similar in the region and haVe even coincided 
intime. In addition, there have-been s cane interesting regional experiments in 
teaching activity and research', which in some cases are pioneer experiments at the 
world level. . 
As notèd, thè tdpic of-integration is being raised at. a time when the 
Nation-State is undergoing a process of redefinition, in which the set of • ' -
stmctviral transformations which have occurred in recent years- are not uninvolved. 
Aftiong them are: the demographic increase and its consequences, the rapid urbani* 
zation process, the distinct significance and historical period in which industrial-
ization has appeared, the expansion of the modern tertiary sector, the rapid 
transformation' of the educational and cultural conditions of the population, the 
capitalist transformation of agriculture and its impact oh immigration, the role 
of the ideology and' of the State with respect to intentionality, all of which 
has affected the nature of the classes and groups and of their interrelationships. 
Furthermore, thèse changes generated new demands, new patterns of behaviour and 
new loyal tie». This latter'kspect is significant, because the functioning of the. 
Nation-State implies loyalties with''respect to some institutions considered to be 
basic, among them and of particular: importance for» the democratic system, are 
those connected With parties liîbour organizations and òthèr institutionalized 
forms of organization. The picture spread throughout Latin America was that the 
phenomena of the presence of new sectors would be resolved through incorporation, 
which certainly might involve conflict, but would nevertheless give rise to a 
positive integration into the modern world. The particular nature of the current 
social mobilization process is that it is producing many experiences which may 
clash with each other, so that the conflicts being produced would tend to cause 
disintegration rather; than /integration. 
In the context of the current transformations, young people are not being 
incorporated into the-existing adult world, or even into the extended adult world. 
They will certainly fulfil new roles and occupy new positions. As a result, it 
may be said that the topic is not only a question of broadening .participation in 
the existing Nation-St ate:, iut of redefining the. latter as a response to both 
internal problems and integration needs. 
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XI. SOCIETY AND YOUTH 
1. The relationship of society to. youth: socialization 
If in the preceding pages we have tried to call. attention. to the possible' role of 
young people in the process of change confronting Latin American societies, we 
must also be concerned with the type of problems involved in the relationship.of 
society to young people. Many topics should be raised here, and some have already 
been touched upon, such as socialization in the world of work, policies or other 
areas. Nevertheless, it is advisable for now to refer to some crucial aspects 
whose decisive nature escapes no one. 
a) Family-and socializationt the diversity of situations and, problems . 
The family is generally considered to be the most important of the 
socialization agents, but in recent years there have been frequent references to 
its decline as a decisive factor. Although systematic information in the region 
on the; nature and content of this change is scarce, some trends permit preliminary 
observations to be made. 
In the middle classes, families- frequently evidence.different cultural levels 
among their generations. This reduces the socializing role of the family and 
increases the relations among the young people themselves, so.that the peer group 
exercises a high influence in determining future behaviour. Givii) the speed of 
social change in the region, families in lower sectors of the middle class and 
in the lower strata are also not in a position to socialize their young members to 
participate in the new. society which is emerging, because their values, behaviour 
guidelines and knowledge tend to be inherited from a very recent past. The youth-
adult educational gap and the prolonged period of time during which today's youth 
remain in the educational system, caused the most important socialization area to 
shift to the educational institution, peer groups and images from the mass 
communication, media, to.which young people are widely exposed. 
In the case of the most disadvantaged economic and social groups, the problems 
are serious. In the rural sector there are many examples of temporary work by 
heads of families who, having become migrant workers, are away from the home for 
long periods of .time ; in others the èntire family .moves, either to find a temporary 
job or because of a permanent .migration, in Which cases there is a collapse between 
the cultural guidelines-of the original society and the coming society. There 
are indications in urban areas that, as a result of.the survival strategies of the 
poor classes, changés are being produced in the area of internal authority and 
power structures and intra-family legitimacy. In many cases the rate of 
participation of adult women rises considerably, as does work outside the home, 
also causing young people to lose the opportunity to be socialized by their 
parents „ : • 
/The socialization 
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The socialization of marginal urban youth is complex and contradictory; the 
latter because in many senses the transition from childhood to the adult world is 
so rapid and abrupt that it deprives them of a conventional period of youth. The 
premature insertion into the labour market, the.lack of education.and the 
consensual marriage or union at an early age throw these young people into adult 
responsibilities and full interaction with grown-ups. However,:adolescents who 
belong to;this group continue with their value-formation process;: although for 
reasons ,.of necessity many of them must assume responsibilities typical of adult 
status." !.. '.. ' . ' ..••••••• 
Ih familiés from low strata, interaction and shared activities with parents 
are practically non-existent:. While discussion seems -most often- to be the main 
method of control in the middle strata, the socialization of young people in the 
most disadvantaged strata is frequently carried out by resorting to. forms of .•• 
control connected with.a type of disciplinary supervision. Agressivity and its 
social expression appear..«Ûfferently according to the social-stratum in which 
they occur. ^ ^ . • :r'; ; 
h) Importance of education. Its particular significance in"Latin Afnerica 18/ 
The difficulties referred to with respect to the family as an effective 
socialization agent lead us,to pay due.attention to the educational system, 
conceiving the latter in a broader sense than that of the mere transmission 
of skills and knowledges. ; ' 
Among the various changes denoted in the transition process in Latin America, 
education is the one which appears'most often,'and among thè various social demands, 
education is favoured in the:aspirations of. all social groves. r 
Without disparaging' the1 plé'innifig efforts of the governmé'nts of; the region, 
educational progress is. above all ' the "'¿'esuit of social mobilization in the sense 
that the different social groves -at?different'tifes- have expréssed vigorous ! 
aspirations which in one form or another were accepted and channelled by the 
governments. The social aspirations have been so marked that even those 
governments who attempted, to reslst' that demand, either for economic or political 
reasons, were not able to contain it. ;Vi" ' v 
When the educational" eyoìlitijòn̂  biPf"thé"'region • is compared with that of 
European countries, the most" striking phenomenon is that in the" latter, the 
educational aspirations of Society âccôn|janied the requirements òf the market 
with respect to educational qualifications of labour, and each" social group 
aspired to obtain the education corresponding to its stratified level in the 
society, while in Latin America," krevolution in expectations concerning 
education occurred. Society Values" education to such a high degree that the 
demand goes beyond the requirements òf the job market for ̂ recruiting the work 
force, and neither education nor the aspirations for it have a correlation with 
the social position of the family. While in the area of housing or income, for 
example, the urban groups in the lower strata are satisfied with limited levels, 
in the area of education their aspirations are infinite. In modest families, 
with precarious housing and conditions of work, parents who are illiterate and 
/have rudimentary 
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have rudimentary primary education aspire to a university education for their 
children. The aspiration seems to be untenable if one considers that in those 
homes, there is no cultural capital or instruments of formation, such as books, 
and that they will require the economic effort from an early age of the very 
children who they hope will have such cultural prospects. This discrepancy is . 
usually interpreted as a sign of imbalance between social status and aspirations. 
However, in its wake are the most important elements of the construction of an 
alternative style of development of Latin American society. 
They are basically of three types: the aspiration to. social mobility, the 
hierarchy of the cultural dimension and the longing for national integration. : 
The political discourse from the declaration of independence on stated that the 
societies of the New World were making themselves into different societies in . 
which equality was the norm and the Social position of individuals depended on 
their merits and virtties. This statement -despite the fact that reality indicated 
the contrary- was repeated as the basis of the legitimacy of the political system 
and assimilated by society, which believed and believes that it is the valid one, 
which is why education Was considered to be the form in which those statements 
could be made into reality. This on the one hand esqplains why individuals take 
responsibility for their limited social achievements; in the surveys carried out 
in Latin America, interviewees frequently explain their.1 lack of social success 
on the basis of their low educational level and not'because of discriminations 
to which they might have been subjected as a result of an unfair distribution of 
social power. But the counterpart of this self-blame is the demand for educational 
services in order to make the basic political discourse into a reality. Since, 
on the other hand, the labour market and the recognition-of social position awarded, 
a high value to educational capital -which is measured by the high difference of 
income between educated and non-educated people and the reserving of prestigious 
social positions for those who have high levels of education- the democratic 
component of the educational demand found support in those rewards connected to 
economic aspects and position in society, the value of which grew to the extent 
that consumption and material welfare gained prestige with the diffusion of the 
standards of the capitalist society. 
The Second element is that of the hierarchy of the cultural dimension. In 
the European societies, culture was associated with the status of a higher social 
group, and culture constituted a group distinction which was transmitted basically 
by the family, which among other things manifested itself in the importance of 
the different forms of speech as an indication of the social origin of individuals. 
In Latin America, the long cycle of conflicts preceding the State constitution 
and the succession of economic changes with the consequent partial or total 
renovation of the higher groups, prevented -with some exceptions- the persistence 
of a carrier group of a superior culture transmittable through the family. On 
the contrary, culture was a creation of the educational system, therefore 
theoretically accessible to all. Becoming educated was a way for a person to 
acquire a new dimension which was proving to be as or more prestigious than the 
accumulation of goods. This fact, which was interpreted negatively as contrary 
to the values of economic development and which was explained by some authors as 
the result of a transmission of chivalresque models of the Portuguese-Spanish 
colony, must be interpreted as a value which foreshadows or contains in seminal 
form the elements which would constitute the key of post-modern societies. 
/The third 
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The third element is national integration. In the societies whijqh originated 
from international immigration and are composed for the most, part , pf- the fusion • 
of multi-racial contributions, gathered together arbitrarily-in,-relations of 
personalized dependence, the aspiration to constitute .the nation was .thwarted again 
and again by the, exclusivist tendencies of the groups- holding the power. In the 
oligarchical régimes, the. people were disqualified from intervening in government :: 
because of their ignorances which was maintained because of the lack of available 
education; subsequently, the restrictive discourse of.the political bureaucracies 
or those of the technocratic groups maintained that the complexity of the problems 
to be resolved qualified only a few to adopt decisions, that is, in both cases 
the lack of education was . resorted to as the • forijial reason for exclusionrin a ,. 
national, and therefore cpaaaticipatory society.,^Education. remains associated 
with citizenship,.. and in .gome Latin American societies, illiteracy excluded ,people 
from voting up to the 1970s. But, beyond ;the legal restrictions to the status of -
citizen, education was-perceived cis-the best:way tq-be; able,to participate-in the. 
political, that is the national, "society. ..•,-.'•»• -,-. -.--. VT • • 
2* The problems of soqial policy:for.young,people 
Despite the fact that some progress, may be observed in. the region with respect to 
the social policies, designed for youth and that in= some cases,-. institutions exist 
which are devoted exclusively to young people, a number of problems remain to be 
overcome. Many of them are attributable to more general problems;19/ for example, 
the conception of the role of global social policies in development continues to -
have serious .deficiencies^ In addition, social policies, tend to be fragmented ;., 
sectorally and have a high degree of dispersion. With respect t. youth specifically, 
the sector concerned with them often occupies a relatively marginal position, in 
the political-administrative structure. 
. There is no doubt that in the last twenty years there has been obvious, 
progress with respect to how the relationship between social planning and economic 
planning or the relationships between economic development and social development 
should be conceived, but the practice often appears to be outdistanced with 
respect to conceptual formulation, and the strictly economic dimensions are 
favoured by the implicit supposition that social improvements may be derived-
from the economic results achieved. Without, disregarding the relationship between 
the two dimensions, an approach of this type tends to consider social policies 
to be subordinate. :-.-• 
Furthermore, although the field of social policies has, widened, the core 
of those policies continues generally to provide a traditional view which conceives 
the social area only in relation to the so-called "social sectors", that is 
education, health, housing and social .security, The role of social groups in 
the development dynamic, ..their societal options, and the emphasis on people, as 
an objective of society and as.active participants in the. formation and 
transformation of society, are still barely recognized. Social policies, therefore, 
are hardly considered as a unified body which goes beyond purely sectoral actions, 
without undervaluing the importance of the latter. ; t 
/With regard 
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With regard to the formulation of national policies on youth, this weakness 
has meant that while in many cases national plans mention some global objectives 
with respect to youth and their participation in society, when these references 
are expressed in terns of aims, they appear unclearly defined, and finally almost 
disappear, even when operative forms such as specific action programmes are raised» 
In cases where youth policies do exist, they generally consider only the areas of 
social welfare, extra-curricular éducation, utilization of free time and community 
service. 
A second area in which problems are raised is that of the conception of 
social policies as a set of sectoral actions which are characterized by their 
dispersion and carried out by various agencies with little or no co-ordination. 
The consequence of:this sectoral fragmentation is that, although there might be a 
health, education or housing policy, there is no social policy, no integrated social 
policy directed to specific social groups. The division among the social policies 
does not take place concerning problems, but according to a differentiation of 
administrative competences in attending to social needs. As a consequence of 
the above, the assumption upon which the formulation of social policies is based 
is that in the first stage of human existence, problems are attended to by the 
family with the support of the ministry of héalth, and in cases where there are 
pre-school activities, the latter are handled by the ministry of social welfare; 
once children reach school age, it is supposed that they are under the protection 
of the ministries of education, which supervise both their academic formation and 
other aspectsj while social weIfare and the utilization of free time continue to 
be under the protectorship of the ministries of social welfare or ministries of 
youth. When that stage is concluded, they become adults and the:',"1 opportunities 
depend on economic policy and their protection on the ministries of labour until 
they reach old age, at which point they are once again in the sphere of ministries 
of welfare. Cultural actions are understood to be carried out by the ministries 
of education which act for the mass of pupils, supplemented by a cultural diffusion 
of museums, theatres, music, etc., directed towards the adult population as a whole. 
The result of the sectoral fragmentation of social policies is that there is 
a wide range of youth needs in the area of health, nutrition, housing, labour 
training arid income which are outside of the protection of the State. In these 
areas the action carried out by State or private institutions are in most cases 
conceived to solve-problems typical of the adult world. Thus there are health 
and nutrition programmes designed for mothers to meet the problem of mother-child 
health. Housing policiès, when they are oriented towards the lower strata, attend 
exclusively to formed families and preferably those which have a substantial 
number of children, are without housing or have some other specific feature. There 
is very little instance of housing policies for young couples hoping to start a 
family, dèspite the frequency of early formation of households among youth from 
the lower sectors. For their part, the ministries of the economy, when envisaging 
their businèss development policies, rarely leave room for policies aimed at the 
creation of youth enterprise or youth co-operatives. Finally, when there is an 
attempt to increase the production and income of farmers, the training programmes 
are directed towards heads of families; if the attempt is to train labour in. a 
region where an industrial investment is to be made, the objective is to retrain 
the existing, that is adult, labour, so that it may shift from craft industry to 
/industrial production; 
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industrial production; or if it is a question of helping to mobilize a group so 
that it may identify its problems and express its demands,;the actions are carried 
out by the community organizations!.'which are made. up of heads of families, that „.? 
is adults. ••-.,.;• • '-•••••. . . ,,.,•. 
The sectoral fragmentation of social poli-cy is in turn closely connected to 
the marginality in the political-administrative structure of the sectors whose 
specific concern is youth. In general both social policies featuring a massive 
social integration and those of a selective nature are affected by "clientele" 
relations between the institutions of the poHtical-ad»inistrative structure and 
the social groups, whether they are; large concentrations or specific population 
groups. Normally these social : groups , already.connected, to.existing public 
institutions, become pressure elements and tend to conserve the type of orientation 
prevailing in the service. Given the fact ; that social policies have been 
fragmented and their extension to youth extremely restricted, .access particularly 
by youth sectors with greater difficulties in organizing themselves, such as 
marginal urban youth, is blocked by a great.rigidity. ? t < 
The latter circumstance may still be observed in the. case of the ministries 
of education which have direct responsibility for children and young people. It 
was assumed, in elaborating the policies, that all children and young people would 
be included in those service's. However,; as alrea<fy noted, a high, percentage of 
their "clientele" is actually not included in those services, nor are they attended 
to by anyone, if accoitat is-taken, of. the large-scale.school drop-out rate, in the 
primary educational system and, to a lesser degree, at some level of secondary 
education. Since these children should be included in the educational process, 
in cases of marginality within the educational system,, they are treated as if they 
did not exist. When educational policies differing from the formal ones are 
implemented, as in the case of evening schools , they rare elaborated for the 
education of adults and'not to satisfy:the educational needs of young people, 
although young people itt the lower sectors often represent more than half of the 
total enrollment of these institutions. 
Finally, account must be taken of the fact, that not only, must the orientation 
of the services provided be reformulated. One of the .main.; objectives-is that 
they should "provide a high, degree of participation of youth],-in terms of the 
inclusion of youth in the decision-making process. It is;assumed that they;will 
in this way be able to take on the relevant responsibilities and also collaborate 
in implementing them. This means recognizing, autonomous youth.: organizations as 
a valid participant insociety's discussions and .trusting in.the--potential 
creative capacity of young people. i --r:;.\ 
In short, the analysis of the situation and prospects of. youth in Latin 
America raises the urgent need to mobilize social forces in an integrated way in 
order to meet the-problems of youth in the development of the . region, including the 
active participation of young people themselves. There is need for a truly, 
coherent strategy on Latin American youth1, which must also take place within the 
context of a global strategic view of regional development. As the previous 
analysis has' Shown, any policies and programmes formulated, on youth will have not 
/only to 
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only to be aimed at establishing mechanisms for integrating young people into the 
prevailing model of development because current economic, social and political 
conditions do not permit it,' but will have to propose the definition of new 
alternative development styles, with respect to youth. 
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This Annex contains a series of data on the youth population in Latin America which 
will provide empirical support for the assertions made in the text in connection 
with the diagnosis of the situation and needs of youth in Latin America. 
The attached tables summarize different present characteristics of Latin 
American youth and their evolution during the period 1960-1980. On the basis of 
projections made by the Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), some indicators 
of the size of the youth population of the region in the year 2000 are also 
presented, and are compared with the population of 1960. 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide demographic background on youth in Latin America 
during the period 1960-2000. The information is presented according to a typology 
establishing three groups of countries: Group A, composed of countries of relatively 
early urbanization, with low fertility rates and high life expectancy, Group B, 
composed of later urbanization, with high fertility rates and a relatively lower 
life expectancy, and Group C, composed of countries with strong polarization. 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 summarize the information available on the participation of 
youth in economic activity, according to urban-rural regions and estimates of the 
size of the young labour force through the year 2000, by country. 
Tables 7 and 8 highlight the speed of the incorporation of young women into 
the labour force and the changes in the occupational profiles of the last decades 
in Chile and Panama. 
Tables 9 to 12 give an account of the extent of open unemployment among young 
people by urban-rural area and sex. 
The changes in the levels of education during the period 1960-1980 are provided 
in tables 13 and 14. Table 15 indicates the urban-rural differences in illiteracy 
as an indicator of the diversity of situations within the youth population. 
Table 16 indicates the intergenerational differences (young people vs. adults) 
in terms of educational levels according to urban-rural area. 
Finally, table 17 provides evidence of the speed of the changes in the 
educational levels within different socio-occupational categories of the youth 
population of Chile and Panama. 
Table 1 








Per capita gross domestic 
product at market prices 
i Q " " ^ J — 1 1 — „ „ xy I\J uuneirs 
1955-1960 1975-1980 1995-2000 1975-1980 1975--1980 1975--198Ó 1980 1980 
Group A a/ 
Argentina 3.1 2.9 2.5 21.2 . 8 .9 69 .2 81 .6 1 41i;6 
Costa Rica 7.1 3.6 2.9 29.0 5 .3 69 .7 45 .7 1 001.1 
Cuba 3.8 2.2 2.1 : 17.0 6 .0 64, .8 66 .9 
Chile 5.2 3.1. 2.5 25.4 8 .1 65. .7 . 78 .7 1 044.5 
Uruguay 2.9 2.9 2.6 20.3 10 .1 69, .5 83 .8 1 462.4 
Group B b/ 
Bolivia 6.7 6.4 5.5 44.8 17, .5 48, .6 44, .7 382.1 
Ecuador 7.0 ' 6.3 4.7 41.6 10. .4 60. .0 44 .7 729.7 
El Salvador 6.8 6.0 4.5 42.1 9. .4 62. .2 44, .2 428.1 
Guatemala 6.9 5.7 4.3 . 41.1 10. .9.. 57. .8 36 .5 559.6 
Haiti 6.2 5.9 5.2 41.8 15, .7 50. .7 23, .1 146.7 
Honduras 7.2 7.1 5.0 47.0 11. .8 57. .1 38. .8 339.7 
Nicaragua 7.3 6.6 5.0 46.6 .12.2 55. .2 . 53. 8 , 345.4 
Paraguay 6.6 5.2 3.8 36.7 7. .7 64. ,1' 38. .6 632.5 
Peru 6.9 5.5 4.6 38.6 11. .6 ' 57. 6 63. .4 . 677.0 
Dominican Rep. 7.5 4.8 3.2 36.7 9.0 60. ,3 46. • 8 560.4 
Group C c/ 
Brazil 6.2 4.4 3.3 33.3 9. ,3 61. .8 62. .8 956.2 
Colombia 6.7 4.3 3.0 32.1 8. ,2 62. ,2 66. .3 830.6 
Mexico 6.8 5.4 3.3 38.3 7. 64. 4 - 67. ,3 1 357.9 
Panama 5.9 4.1 .2.9 31.3 6. ,0. 69. 7 55. 3 1 149.5 
Venezuela 6.8 4.7 ~3.3 36.9 6. ,2 66. ,2 76. .2 - 1 277.6 
Total Latin America 5.9 4.6 -.3.4 33.9 9. ,0 62. ,7. 63. .3 1 007.6d/ 
Source: CELADE, Demographic. Bulletin No. 27, January 1981 and ECLA, on the basis of official information concerning the gross domestic product. 
I 
Ul o 
al Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high, life expectancy.' 
b/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy. 
c/ Countries of high polarization. / 
d/ Excluding Cuba. 
Table 12 
LATIN AMERICA: VOLUME» RELATIVE IMPORTANCE AND GROWTH RATES OF 
THE YOUTH POPULATION (196U-2Û00) 
Population 15-24 
(thousands) 
years Percentage of 15 to 24 years 
population of total population 
Average annual 
growth rates (%) 
1960 1980 2000 1960 1980 2000 1960-1980 1980-2000 
Group A a/ 
Argentina 3 315.7 4 5C9.4 5 3b6.8 16.1 16.7 16.2 1.5 0.9 Costa Rica 213,9 5C9.3 558.9 17.3 23.0 17.7 4.4 0.8 Cuba I 312.5 1 912.8 1 554.6 18.7 19.7 13.3 1.9 -1.0 Chile 1 382.8 2 326.8 2 575.1 18.2 21.0 17.2 2.6 0.5 Uruguay 401.0 476.8 519.5 15.8 16.4 15.6 0.9 0.4 
Group B b/ 
Bolivia 634.3 1 055.6 1 890.1 18.5 19.0 19.4 2.6 3.0 Ecuador 791.0 1 587.9 2 930.6 17.9 19.8 20.1 3.6 3.1 El Salvador 455,4 956.3 1 737.6 17.7 19.9 20.0 3.8 3.0 Guatemala 721.0 1 449.3 2 493.1 18.2 20.0 19.6 3.6 2.7 Haiti 684.0 1 122.9 1 928.6 18.3 19.3 19.6 2.5 2.7 S Honduras 363.5 706.3 1 432.7 18.7 19.1 20.5 3.4 3.6 i Nicaragua 266.9 550.5 1 057.0 18.1 20.1 20.5 3.7 3.3 Paraguay- 316.8 658.2 1 073.8 17.8 20.8 19.9 3.7 2.5 Peru 1 835.1 3 517.2 5 840.4 18.0 20.0 19.0 3.3 2.6 Dominican Rep. 591.6 1 274.4 1 813.4 18.2 21.4 19.4 3.9 1.8 
Group C c/ 
Brazil 13 076.8 25 005.5 35 028.1 18.3 20.4 18.7 3.3 1.7 Colombia 2 788.4 5 657.2 7 191.7 17.9 21.9 18.9 3.6 1.2 Mexico 6 604.9 14 057.2 23 613.9 17.9 20.2 20.4 3.9 2.6 Panama 195.1 383.2 518.9 17.8 20.2 18.4 3.4 1.5 Venezuela 1 295.8 3 277.5 5 455.1 17.2 21.0 20.1 4.7 2.6 
Source: CELADE projections prepared on the basis of official information, 
a/ Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy, 
b/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy, 
c/ Countries of hieh polarization. 
Table 12 
LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL POPULATION AND YOUTH POPULATION RESIDING IN URBAN AREAS 
(1970, 1980, 2000) 
Percentage of total urban 
population 
Percentage of urban population 
15-24 years 
1970 1980 2000 1970 1980 2000 

















































































































































Source: CELADE projections prepared on the basis of official information. 
a] Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy, 
b/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy. 
cj Countries of high polarization. 
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Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 24 
YEARS OF AGE IN THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, ACCORDING 
TO URBAN-RURAL AREA (1970-2000) 
Group A a/ 
1970 1980 2000 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Argentina 23.5 30.8 23.2 30.0 22.0 28.4 Costa Rica 30.1 34.7 31.7 35.4 22.4 24.1 Cuba 22.7 29.3 23.3 30.6 14.5 19.5 Chile 25.4 28.0 26.1 28.6 19.8 21.3 Uruguay 21.4 23.9 22.4 24.9 20.9 23.1 
Group B b/ 
Bolivia 29.7 26.5 28.6 26.3 24.9 32.1 Ecuador 28.3 30.0 29.4 30.5 28.0 27.9 El Salvador 30.8 30 o 7 32.7 32.5 29.5 29.6 Guatemala 30.7 31.9 30.7 31.7 26.8 29.0 Haiti. 29.2 25. 3 ' 30.9 26.8 30.6 26.4 Honduras 32.2 29.0 34.5 31.4 33.3 30.3 Nicaragua 30.6 33.2 31.3 33.6 29.3 : 31.3 Paraguay 34.5 34.2 31.4 36.5 28.5 30.8 Peru 25.6 24.2 26.7 24.5 25.2 •21.6 Dominican Rep. 28.9 29.2 30.3 30.8 23.3 24.4 
Group C c/ 
Brazil 28.5 32 o 8 28.9 33.4 24.6 29.1 Colombia 32.6 30.7 32.5 30.9 24.8 23.7 Mexico 30.3 32.6 31.2 33.2 27.4 29.0 Panama 30.9 31.2 30.6 30.6 24.0 23.4 Venezuela 29.1 30.9 30.2 32.1 25.6 27.4 
Source; CELADE projections prepared on the basis of official information, 
a/Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life 
expectancy. 
b/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life 
expectancy, 
c/ Countries of high polarization. 
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Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: ACTIVITY RATES OF THE POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 24 
YEARS OF AGE, ACCORDING TO URBAN-RURAL AREA (1970, 1980 AND 2000) 
Group A a/ 
1970 1980 2000 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Argentina' 57, ,3 58. 0 58. 0 56. ,4 58. ,5 52. ,8 
Costa Rica 46« ,7 54. 4 ' 48. 5 52. ,9 50. ,9 49, ,2 
Cuba 43. ,4 45. 1 42. 1 43, ,5 44, ,7 44, ,0 
Chile 41. ,3 50. 8 41. 8 49, ,4 42. ,8 46, ,7 
Uruguay 54. 3 62. 0 54. 2 59, ,2 56, ,7 56, ,0 
Group B b/ 
Bolivia 41. , 3 51. Ó 42. 2 49, ,3 42, ,5 46, ,9 
Ecuador 39. ,9 50. 8 41. 1 16, ,5 43, ,0 45, .6 
El Salvador 53. ,3 57. 1 53. 9 55, .9 54, ,8 53. .5 
Guatemala 48, ,0 48. 8 48. 9 47, ,8 50, ,3 46, ,0 
Haiti 56. ,6 75. 8 56. 2 74, ,4 55, ,7 71, .5 
Honduras 43, ,9 51. 6 47. 2 52, ,0 52, ,5 47, ,3 
Nicaragua 41, ,1 48. 9 42. 9 48, ,6 45, ,1 47, ,2 
Paraguay 55, ,5 55. 6 57. 2 55, 58, ,4 54, .1 
Peru 39, ,0 48. 6 39. 9 46. ,9 : 42, .5 44, .9 
Dominican Rep. 43, .3 53. 3 43. 7 53, .1 45, .0 52. ,8 
Group C c/ 
Brazil 45, ,7 55 o 0 46. 3 54, ,2 47, ,9 52, .6 
Colombia 48, ,1 51. 7 48. 7 51. ,3 49, .8 50 .2 
Mexico 41, .1 48. 0 42. 8 47, .3 45, .5 45 .8 
Panama 55, , 7 57. 8 c 55. 8 56, ,1 55, .6 52, ,3 
Venezuela 42, .1 47. ,6 43. ,3 47, .1 44, »8 46 .1 
Source: CELADE projections prepared on the basis of official information. 
a/ Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life 
expectancy. 
b/ Countries of late urbanizations high fertility rate and low life 
expectancy. •• • . 
c/ Countries of high polarization. 
Table 4122 
LATIN AMERICA: ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION BETWEEN 10 AND 24 YEARS 
OF AGE ACCORDING TO URBAN-RURAL AREA (1970, 1980 AND 2000) 
(Thousands of persons) 
Percentage of active 
1970 1980 2000 urban population 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 1970 1980 2000 
Group A a/ 
Argentina 1 888„9 649o4 2 191.7 597„5 2 749.0 506 o0 74,4 78.6 84 « 5 
Costa Rica 70„1 123.8 124.3 155.6 194.2 125.0 36.2 44.4 60.8 
Cuba 371.3 293 o 7 515.4 306.1 527.7 169.1 55.8 62.7 75.7 
Chile 574 o 9 213.4 797.5 234 o 7 956.6 184.5 72.9 77.3 83.8 
Uruguay 201 = 3 58 „ 2 221.9 53.6 260.6 45.1 77.6 80.5 85.2 
Group B b/ 
Bolivia 170.6 271.3 251.7 295.0 494.9 431.4 38.6 46.0 53.4 
Ecuador 213.6 377.8 342.9 459.6 793.8 597.5 36.1 42.7 57.1 
El Salvador 170.5 280.8 272.1 351.1 594.4 472.1 37.8 43.7 55.7 
Guatemala 199.3 409.9 298.1 530.7 582.3 784.6 32.7 36.0 42.6 
Haiti 143.6 674.3 213.6 815.9 468.2 1 107.2 17.6 20.7 29.7 
Honduras 84.4 208.5 15206 262.9 446.3 327.6 28.8 36.7 57.7 
Nicaragua 84.1 124.4 140.4 148.5 338.3 196.0 40.3 48.6 63.3 
Paraguay 113.3 165.9 157.8 250.9 301.8 361.3 40.6 38.6 45.5 
Peru 658.1 482.3 1 005.6 557.7 1 969.8 636.2 57.7 64.3 75.6 
Dominican Rep. 192.1 360.1 327.5 448.9 588.4 419.1 34.8 42.2 58.4 
Group C c/ 
Brazil 4 966 o 7 5 714.0 7 628.6 6 268.0 12 995.7 5 594.9 46.5 54.9 69.9 
Colombia 1 377.5 968.2 2 078.8 1 062.5 3 041.0 857.5 58.7 66.2 78.0 
Mexico 2 605.3 2 150.2 4 293.3 2 500.1 8 725.1 2 667.4 54.8 63.2 76.6 
Panama 86.3 88.8 133.7 98.5 213.0 85.8 49.3 57.6 71.3 
Venezuela d_/ 667.4 241.4 1 126.2 318.8 2 077.8 378.1 73.4 77.9 84.6 
Latin America 14 839.3 13 856.4 22 273.7 15 716.6 38. 318,9 15 946.4 51.7 58.6 70.6 
Source: CELADE projections prepared on the basis of official information. 
a/ Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy, 
b/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy. 
£_/ Countries of high polarizati on „ d/ Excluding active population between 10 and 14 years of aee. 
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Table 7 
LATIN AMERICAS AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF THE TOTAL ECONOMICALLY 
ACTIVE POPULATION AND THE POPULATION BETWEEN 10 AND 24 
YEARS OF AGE (1970-1980) 
Total country Urban areas 
Economically active population Economically active population 
Total Youth Female Total Youth Female 
(10-24) (10-24) (20-24) (10-24) (10-24) (20-24) 
Group A a/ 
Argentina 1.3 1.0 1.5 2.2 1.8 1.5 1.9 2.5 
Costa Rica 3.9 3.7 4.9 5.8 5.5 5.9 6.1 6.7 
Cuba 2.0 2.1 2.9 1.8 3.1 3.3 3.7 2.6 
Chile 2.8 2.7 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.6 
Uruguay 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.3 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.5 
Group B b/ 
Bol iv ia 2.4 2.2 2.8 3.3 4.5 4.0 4.2 5.1 
Ecuador 3.1 3.1 4.2 5.1 4.6 4.8 5.1 6.0 
El Salvador 3.1 3.3 4.1 4.8 4.3 4.8 5.1 5.7 
Guatemala 3.4 3.1 4.1 5.1 4.3 4.1 4.5 5.6 
Haiti 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.7 3.7 4.1 3.8 4.1 
Honduras 3.4 3.6 7.3 7.5 5.5 6.1 6.7 6.9 
Nicaragua 3.5 3.3 4.3 5.7 5.1 5.3 5.3 6.4 
Paraguay 4.0 3.9 4.3 5.7 4.5 3.4 4.0 5.6 
Peru 3.0 3.2 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.3 5.1 4.9 
Dominican Rep. 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.6 5.3 5.5 5.3 5.9 
Group C c/ 
Brazil . 3.0 2.7 3.5 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.7 4.9 
Colombia 3.3 3.0 3.6 4.4 4.4 4.2 4.1 4.8 
Mexico 3.6 3.6 4.2 5.8 4.9 5.1 5.5 7.2 
Panama 3.2 2.9 3.7 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.6 5.2 
Venezuela 4.4 4.8 5.4 6.5 5.0 5.4 5.7 6.7 
Latin America 2.9 2.9 3.5 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.9 
Sources CELADE projections prepared on the basis of official information, 
a_/ Countries of early urbanizations low fertility rate and high life expectancy, 
b_/ Countries of late urbanizations high fertility rate and low life expectancy« 
c/ Countries of high polarization. 
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Table 8 
CHILE AND PANAMA: DISTRIBUTION OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE FEMALE POPULATION 
BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE ACCORDING TO VARIOUS 
SOCIO-OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES (1960, 1970 AND 1980) 
1960 1970 1980 
Chile 
Office workers9 salespeople, 
professionals 19,0 27.2 34.0 
Agricultural workers 3.0 2.1 2.3 
Drivers and manual workers 17,6 16.1 7.8 
Day workers and personal services 6.1 7.1 6.0 
Domestic workers 48.4 39.9 29.3 
Others, unemployed 6.0 7.6 20.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Active population (in thousands) (187.3) (199.9) (302.7) 
Panama 
Office workers, sales peoples, 
professionals 31.6 30.5 40.6 
Agricultural workers 7.3 5.2 3.7 
Drivers and manual workers 4.8 6.4 4.5 
Day workers and personal services 4.6 5.7 4.7 
Domestic workers 40.0 36.3 28.1 
Others, unemployed 11.7 15.9 18.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Active population (in thousands) (25.0) (47.7) (47.9) 
Source: Calculated on the basis of official information from population 
censuses and national employment surveys. 
Table 12 
LATIN AMERICA: OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES ACCORDING TO SEX AND AGE 
(Urban areas, 1980) 
Both sexes Men Women 
Total 15-19 20-24 25 and Total 15-19 20-24 25 and Total 15-19 20-24 25 and over over over 
Argentina (1981) 
Capital and Greater Buenos 
Aires 5.0 14.6 7.6 3.7 4.9 13.0 8.6 3.7 5.1 17.1 5.9 3. 7 
Colombia (1980) 
7 largest units 3.1 22.9 12.0 Q /. O 7.6 21.2 10=5 3.0 11.5 24.8 13.9 4.4 
Costa Rica (1982) 
Urban areas 10.4 25.5 12.9 5.2 9.9 26.2 11.6 4.9 11.5 23.9 15.3 5.8 
Chile (1980) 
Urban areas 11.4 26.1 21.5 7.5 11.9 28.2 22.2 8.1 10.3 22.0 20.4 6.2 
Mexico (1979) 
Metropolitan area 
Mexico City 6.1 17.6 9.4 2.8 5.4 16.7 9.7 2.4 7.5 18.9 9.0 3.6 
Panama (1979) 
National 8.8 24.5 18.4 4.3 6.7 20.4 15.0 3.1 13.5 33.5 24.6 7.2 
Paraguay (1977) 
Asuncion and surrounding 
areas 6.7 12.8 10.8 4.0 7.2 14.7 10.2 4.8 6.0 10.6 11.4 2.9 
Peru (1981) 
Urban areas 6.0 13.9 11.8 4.0 5.1 13.9 10.5 3.4 8.4 13.9 14.5 5.9 
Uruguay (1979) 
14.7 Department of Montevideo 8.1 23.6 11.0 5.6 5.6 20.4 8.1 3.4 12.0 28.3 9.2 
Venezuela (1980) 
Caracas metropolitan area 6.0 16.3 9.3 3.8 6.8 19.7 11.2 4.1 4.5 9.8 6.4 3.2 
Source: National household and employment surveys and Population Census of Peru, 1981. 
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Table 10 
LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF UNEMPLOYED 
BY AGE GROUP AND SEX 
(Urban areas, 1980) 
Age Both sexes Men Women 
Argentina (1981) 15-24 41 „2 38.8 46.0 
Capital and Greater 15-19 18.9 15.1 26.4 
Buenos Aires 20-24 22.3 23.7 19.6 
Colombia (1980) 15-29 79 „6 76.8 82.5 
7 largest cities 15= 19 32 o 1 31.2 33.1 
20-29 47.5 45.6 49.4 
Costa Rica (1982) 15° •29 69.9 68.8 71.9 
Urban areas 15= •19 26.5 28.6 22.9 
20-•29 4304 40.2 49.0 
Chile (1980) 15-•24 50.7 48.2 56.8 
Urban areas 15-•19 16.5 16.6 16.3 
20--24 34.2 31.6 40.5 
Mexico (1979) 12--24 69.4 68.4 70.9 
Mexico City 12--19 41.5 39.1 44.9 
Metropolitan area 20--24 27.9 29.3 26.0 
Panama (1979) 15--24 640 7 66.1 63.2 
National 15--19 28.2 30.3 25.8 
20--24 36.5 35.8 37.4 
Paraguay (1977) 12--24 60.8 54.9 70.7 
Asuncion and surrounding 12--19 34.3 34.1 34.6 
areas 20--24 26.5 20.8 36.1 
Peru (1981) 15--24 49.8 48.8 51.5 
Urban areas 15' -19 18.0 17.6 18.8 
20 -24 31.8 31.2 32.7 
Uruguay (1979) 14 -24 46.8 52.5 42.7 
Dept. of Montevideo 14 -19 28.7 34.6 24.4 
20 -24 18.1 17.9 18.3 
Venezuela (1980) 15 -24 54.9 56.5 50.6 
Metropolitan area of 15 -19 26.0 28.0 20.6 
Caracas 20 -24 28.9 28.5 30.0 
Source; National household and ̂ mploymeni: surveys and Population 
Census of Peru, 1981„ 
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Table 11 
LATIN AMERICA: OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AMONG YOUTH 20-29 
YEARS OF AGE, BY SEX AND AREA, ACCORDING 










1 to 3 years 
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13 and over 
Men 
No education 
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10 to 12 years 
13 and over 
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No education 
1 to 3 years 
4 to 6 years 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures taken from OMUECE 1970, Programa 
Uniforme, table 20. 
UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP, La educación y los problemas del empleo, Informes 
finales No. 3, op. cit.., table 29. 
Table 12 
CHILEs PANAMAS OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN THE POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE, 
ACCORDING TO EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND SEX (I960, 19 70 AND 1980) 
1960 1970 1980 
Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women 
CHILE 
Educational level 
0 - 3 4.6 5.5 1.8 1.3 1.6 0.4 13.5 13.6 12.8 
4 - 6 5.9 7.0 3.0 1.6 1.9 0.8 14.2 15.5 10.3 
7 - 9 8.9 8.5 10.2 2„8 2.8 2.8 19.9 21.1 16.4 
10 and over 10.4 10.9 9.4 6.1 7.0 4.7 25 » 3 24.8 26.0 
Total 6.4 7.5 4.4 2.5 2.6 2.0 20.6 20.7 20.5 
PANAMA 
Educational level 
0 - 3 1.7 1.4 3.9 4.3 2.8 10.5 IO. 5 6.9 24.4 
4 - 6 7.4 6.8 9.0 9.8 7.0 16 o 3 11.1 10.6 12.9 
7 - 9 12.3 10.1 15.8 15.4 15.5 23.7 16.7 14.9 21.0 
10 and over 10.6 9.0 12.1 9.6 8.5 10.8 19.2 18.6 19.9 
Total 6.5 5.3 10.1 9.3 6.5 15.3 14.7 12.9 18.4 
Source; Calculated on the basis of official information from population censuses and national employment surveys. 
Table 12 
CHILE, BRAZIL, PANAMA AND PERU: EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF THE POPULATION 
BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE (1960-1970-1980) 
Total 
(Thousands) 0 1-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 13 and over N.D. 
Chile 
1960 1 322.4 100.0 9.3 18.4 38.6 19.9 9.3 1.3 3.1 
1970 1 662.2 100.0 3.4 10.6 31.1 26.2 15.9 3.5 9.6 
1980 2 440.7 100.0 1.7 2.5 13.8 32.5 41.3 6.4 1.7 
Brazil 
1960 13 644.2 100.0 35.8 31.8 21.3 4.8 3.9 1.8 0.4 
1970 18 652.0 100.0 30.6 17.9 28.1 5.4 3.9 1.2 12.8 
1980 24 904.1 100.0 17.0 18.3 47.7a/ 13.9b/ 3. Oc/ -
Panama 
1960 197.2 100.0 18.3 16.2 40.2 15.3 8.4 1.3 0.2 
1970 269.6 100.0 10.4 12.2 43.7 19.1 12.2 2.3 0.1 
1980 361.8 100.0 4.8 5.2 31.8 26.1 24.5 6.9 0.8 
Perù 
1961 1 822.0 100.0 29.9 28.4 23.1 10.3 5.9 1.0 1.4 
1972 2 563.9 100.0 12.9 25.9 ,20.1 13. 3.4 2.4 
1981 3 443.5 100.0 6.3 35\9 45". 3 9.2 3.3 




1 to 4 years. 
9 to 11 years. 
10 and over. 
Table 14 
LATIN AMERICA: ILLITERACY RATES OF THE POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS OF 















Group A bj 
Argentina 5.1 4 o 2 . = « 1=0 
Costa Rica lOol 5o2 14 „0 7o8 3.6 1.9 3o2 1.7 
Chile 9.7 4o7 21o 3 Ho5 4o2 2o8 3o4 2ol 
Uruguay 2o7 •= ' •= = • = = = 
Group B cj 
Bolivia = 17.3 = = « =. 
Ecuador 23oQ 14 0 2 32 o 6 24 « 9 6 = 6 6o7 4o4 3o8 
El Salvador 45 06 28 » 8 61 = 7 43o4 20 o9 10o3 10o2 4o8 
Guatemala 57 = 2 45 „4 73 » 0 60 = 4 28o0 20 o 5 12o9 9 = 8 
Honduras 48o7 27ol 56 o 2 - 14o9 = 15 » 1 3 = 4 
Nicaragua 35.1 = • = - => = = 
Paraguay 14 o 6 9o6 19 = 6 13 = 0 806 4 = 7 4o 7 3 = 2 
Peru = ' 13o5 =• » = = — 
Group C §j 
Brazil 32o8 24o5 42o4 Hol = 
Colombia 18o5 11.5 30 « 7 23o0 8o 7 6o8 5o5 4 = 8 
Mexico 26 o 2 16 o4 • 38 o5 = 14 o 1 = 8.7 5 = 2 
Panama 18o3 12 ¿4 • 30 » 9 23o8 2o4 2o5 lo4 lo9 
Venezuela = 12o0 = => - • -
1980 
Rural 
6 = 6 
15 » 7 
X7o3 
33 » 6 
2o0 
7.9 
Source; ECLA, "El Desarrollo de América Latina y sus repercusiones en la Educación", Cuadernos de la CEPAL 
Series No. 41, Santiago, Chile, 1982, table 12, p. 85, 
b/ 1/ 
d/ 
Including the capital. 
Countries of early urbanization, 
Countries of late urbanization. 
Countries of high polarization. 
low fertility rate and high life expectancy, 
high fertility rate and low life expectancy. 
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Table 15 
LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ILLITERATE YOUTH BETWEEN 
15 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE BY URBAN-RURAL AREA, 1970 
Percentage of illiterate 
Total illiterate youth „, , y°uth 1 5 - 2 4 
15-24 years T o t a l y e a r s 
Urban Rural 
Group A a/ 
Costa Rica 17 533 100 «o 17.0 83.0 
Chile 82 456 100 o0 47.6 52.4 
Group B b/ 
Bolivia 134 519 100 o 0 14.6 85.4 
Ecuador 159 041 100.0 27.5 72.5 
El Salvador 190 263 100,0 15.9 84.1 
Guatemala 471 038 100.0 IS.9 83.1 
Nicaragua 136 123 100.0 16.4 83, G 
Paraguay 43 000 100.0 20.5 79.5 
Peru 342 664 100.0 22.2 77.8 
Group C c/ 
Brazil 4 517 058 100.0 25.7 74.3 
Colombia 482 702 100.0 42.0 58.0 
Panama 34 631 100.0 10.8 89.2 
Venezuela 241 630 100.0 47.1 52.9 
Source: ECLA, "El desarrollo de America Latina y sus repercusiones en la 
educación", Cuadernos de la CEPAL series No, 41, op. cit.9 tables 6 
and 7, pp, 77-78. 
aj Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy. 
hj of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy, 
c/ Countries of high polarization. 
Table 16 
LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGES OF POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS AND 25 YEARS AND OVER 
WITH 3 OR LESS YEARS OF EDUCATION ACCORDING TO~URBAN-RURAL AREA, 1970 
Total Urban Rue •al 
15 to ; 25 and 24 15 to 24 25 and 15 to 24 25 and over over over 
Group A a/ 
Argentina - - = -
Costa Rica 18.4 47.3 9.1 28.4 26.1 63o4 
Cuba = 
Chile 14 o 9 33.1 10.0 20 o 8 33 o 0 63.2 
Uruguay = — = -
Group B b/ 
Bolivia 37.7 67.7 17.9 43.0 55.3 83 o 8 
Ecuador 31.2 55.5 17.5 36.8 50.8 77.0 
El Salvador 54 o 8 77.4 28.1 57o4 75.8 92.3 
Guatemala 69.3 81.2 40.4 59.3 86.6 93.6 
Haiti 79.8 89.6 50.8 62.9 89.6 95.8 
Honduras 52.5 75.9 - = - = • 
Nicaragua 57.7 73»3 32.1 53.9 83o5 91o9 
Paraguay 32.6 60.2 16.8 39 o9 43.6 73o5 
Peru 35.1 60.0 19 o 3 41o5 65o6 87o5 
Dominican Rep. 44.5 67.2 27o4 41.0 58.4 8204 
Group C c/ 
Brazil — = -
Colombia 40.6 58.5 28.0 48.4 71.5 85.1 
Mexico 44 o 9 67.2 -= = 
Panama 22.6 43o4 7.2 33 o 7 40.3 67.7 
Venezuela 30.4 54.4 22.6 45.5 69.2 89.9 
Source: ECLA, "El desarrollo de America Latina y sus repercusiones en la educación", Cuadernos de la CEPAL 
series No. 41, op. cit., tables 6 and 7, pp. 77-78. 
aj Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy, 
bJ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy. 
cj Countries of high polarization. 
Table 17 
CHILE-PANAMA: EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF THE ACTIVE POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS Of AGE 
ACCORDING TO VARIOUS SOCIO-OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES, 1960, 1970 AND 1980 
Occupational groups Total 
Chile 
Number of years of study Total 






Number of years of study 
0-3 4-6 7-9 10 and over N.D. 
Total active i960 675.9 100.0 31 -7 ifl _ n 14.8 a 1 3-5 95-9 100. 0 31 - 6 - 4 5 . 9 10.7 11. 5 0. 3 population 1970 691-6 100.0 16.9 37.8 18.3 14.5 12-5 149-9 100.0 22.7 48.7 13-5 15-1 1980 940.6 100.0 5.6 19.0 31.8 41.4 2.2 150.4 100.0 10.0 4o. 1 18.1 31-5 0. 3 
Office workers, sales- 1960 96.7 100.0 7.4 2k.9 25-9 7- q 16.O 100.0 1 V • 1 T7 ( * J 1 -7 £L 1 . J I.O «-V TU - W 0. 3 people, professional, 1970 131.9 100.0 4.8 15-4 21.4 44.3 14.2 28.2 100.0 2.2 22.9 I9.2 54.4 1. 3 technical 1980 217-6 100.0 2.8 7-3 17.7 72.2 - 35-4 100.0 0.7 11 .6 I3.4 74.1 0. 2 
Agricultural workers i960 190.2 100.0 55.4 37-6 2.6 0.9 3-5 45.5 100.0 55.0 42.9 1.8 0.3 _ 19 70 154.8 100.0 33.7 48.6 6.5 1.6 9-5 52.1 100.0 47.4 50.1 i 2.0 0.6 
1980 152.8 100,0 12.it 38.7 . 36.2 10.9 1.8 42.3 100.0 2 4 . 5 62.5 9-3 3-7 I 
Drivers, manual 1960 150-6 100.0 15,4 53.5 23-1 6.3 1.7 9-7 100.0 10.2 55-2 22-3 11 .9 0. 
0 
5 * workers 1970 157.7 100.0 10.4 41.2 25-5 10.7 12.1 21.4 100.0 8.9 53-3 25-5 12.0 0. 2 ' 1980 159.8 100.0 4-3 14.9 38-5 39-9 2.4 20.8 100.0 4.8 40.1 3O.5 24.5 
Day workers, 1960 151.9 100.0 bo.5 47.6 8.5 1.0 2.-4 16.7 100.0 18.6 63-3 13-8 • 3-9 "0. 4 personal services 1970 156.1 100.0 19.5 46.7 16.5. 3-8 13.4 32-5 100.0 14.8 65-3 15-3 4-5 1980 204.6 100.0 6.7 27.4 40.4 23.O 2.5 28.8 100.0 6.5 50.8 26.6 15.6 0. 6 
Others 1960 42.7 100.0 17.3 4 0.8 31.1 6.4 4.3 1-7 100.0 8.4 56.4 20.2 14.4 0. 5 1970 73-8 100.0 13.4 31.9 25.7 14.0 15.0 1.6 100.0 8.2 31-3 15.0 43.5 2. 1 1980 l4.g 100.0 10.8 1.6 26.7 60.8 - - - - - - -
Unemployed 1960 43.2 100.0 22.7 38.2 20.7 13.4 4.9 6.2 100.0 8.4 5S-1 20.5 18.7 0. 5 1970 17.2 100.0 8.8 23-8 20.9 35-7 10.8 14.0 100.0 10.4 51-5 22.4 15.6 0. 1 1980 191.2 100.0 3.7 13.6 30.6 50.9 1.2 22.0 100.0 7.2 30.4 20,6 • 41.3 0. 6 
Special tabulations from Population Censuses, except for Chile 1980, National Employment Survey (October-December 1980) 
ri-ino nt-hi>T-o. 
Source: 
a/ Including others. 
